FOREST's ADVANCES

Trying to get rid of surfing, wasted too much time, any suggestion?.......................... 七宗罪?............................... 1,没有原则的政治;2,不劳而获的财富;3,没有理智的享乐;4,没有特点的知识;5,没有道德的商业;6,没有人文关怀的科学;7,没有牺牲的崇拜。............................................. 虽然这是圣雄甘地说老印的.......

Saturday, August 27, 2005

The oil strategy of Russia

俄罗斯放弃安大线 从对华能源合作看普京战略
http://finance.sina.com.cn 2005年01月25日 14:16 《环球》杂志

  《环球》杂志记者/盛世良

  2004年12月底,俄罗斯政府宣布,东西伯利亚石油管线走向尘埃落定——从泰舍特到纳霍德卡。这既不是中国曾寄予厚望的“安大线”,也与日本追求的“安纳线”略有差别,从中隐约透露出大国博弈的刀光剑影和普京战略的浓墨重彩。







  为什么放弃安大线

  泰纳线西起东西伯利亚小城泰舍特,东到太平洋之滨的纳霍德卡,东半段同安纳线一致;管道总长4130公里,造价107.5亿美元,比安大线几乎长一倍,贵三倍以上。莫非俄罗斯人学了款爷脾气,“不求最好,但求最贵”?

  曾有人把安大线落榜,归咎于力主该线的尤科斯公司遭当局封杀,或是日本人横插一杠。其实因果关系远非如此简单。

  早在1994年俄就提出合作铺管线向中国输油的建议。但是像油管这种动辄数十亿上百亿美元的大生意,是不可能很快谈成的,再说,此后油价不断下跌,一度下探9美元一桶的底线,买主干吗急于铺油管!

  没料想,近几年油价扶摇直上,中国石油需求又直线上升。对中国来说,拥有俄罗斯这个既近便又稳定的油源,对本国的能源安全和能源来源多样化很有好处。一年出口2.3亿吨石油的俄罗斯,固然需要中国这个近在咫尺的广阔市场,但从本国长远利益考虑,觉得油管直通大庆不如通太平洋之滨的纳霍德卡好,虽然造价高,但买主将由一家变为中、日、韩、美等多家,使俄处于左右逢源的最佳境地。

  在油气管道仅通一国的问题上,俄罗斯此前曾有不愉快的回忆。当初铺设了分别通东欧某国和西亚某国的管道,后来这两国都以经济不振、能源需求下降为由,提出要么俄罗斯降低出口价,要么它们停止进口,令俄万分无奈。

  再说,俄认为安大线和安纳线离贝加尔湖太近,不利于环保,而且安纳线的5000万吨设计能力,缺乏油源保证。

  相比之下,泰纳线优势多多:远离贝加尔湖,有利于保护“人类最后一盆纯净淡水”,此其一;绕开地震高发区,仅402公里经过低震级区,此其二;最关键的是,穿越东西伯利亚和远东几乎所有重要油气产区,可以最大限度地使资源潜力与管线优势结合,保证8000万吨的设计能力,并能顺道带动整个地区的经济开发;还有,泰舍特距离开发成熟的西西伯利亚油气田不远,可以缓解短期内东西伯利亚油源不足之虞;当然,还可以吊日本胃口,增加同日本在政治上讨价还价的筹码。

  普京外交的轻重缓急

  有人问,俄既然同中国结成了战略协作伙伴关系,在对华能源合作问题上,怎么首先考虑本国利益?

  普京珍惜来之不易的俄中战略协作伙伴关系,但他早已有言在先:俄罗斯外交的首要目标是本国的安全和经济利益。在油管走向、双边经贸结构、中国劳动力出口、军事技术合作等重大问题上,他首先着眼于本国利益。

  况且,俄在确定管线走向时也考虑到伙伴的利益。首先,在油管铺设前,俄罗斯承诺用铁路向中国供油,去年640万吨,今年850万吨,明年将达1500万吨,同安大线一期设计能力也就差500万吨。其次,泰纳线的设计能力由安纳线的5000万吨提高到8000万吨,中点斯科沃罗季诺城离中俄边界仅60公里。有人猜测,这是为了将来从该城修支线到中国,3000万吨差额正好给中国;有人甚至不排除先修支线、再修主线的可能。

  普京以安全和经济利益为考量,安排外交的轻重缓急——独联体为第一优先,欧洲为第二优先,美国第三,中国和印度、日本等东方国家并列第四。

  2004年,俄罗斯比以往更注意维持和加强在独联体的影响,通过支配独联体地区的经济和政治资源,提高自己的身价,改善同西方打交道时的地位。

  格鲁吉亚2003年的“玫瑰革命”和乌克兰2004年的“橙色革命”,使普京领略了美国人对前苏联地区国家搞“民主改造”、挤压俄罗斯战略空间的决心和能力。为防范美国在独联体克隆“玫瑰革命”,避免该地区背离俄罗斯倒向美国,俄对白俄罗斯和中亚国家领导人的态度,由冷淡转为支持,通过双边和多边合作机制,利用由来已久的经济、政治、民族关系,特别是文化“软实力”,加强了同这些国家的整体关系。

  美俄对独联体地区的争夺实际上是苏联东欧剧变的延续。对美国来说,苏联剧变还不彻底,俄罗斯依然是庞然大物,对前苏联地区拥有极大影响。美国想把独联体国家,特别是其中的西部国家,也变成“新欧洲”,纳入西方势力范围。

  为了本国利益,普京在“南北”“东西”的外交方位取舍上,由苏联的“要古巴不要美国佬”、叶利钦的“要美国佬不要古巴”,变成“要美国佬也要古巴”,既与西方加强关系,也跟古巴、朝鲜、伊朗等美国眼中的“邪恶国家”交好,成功地改善了俄罗斯的外交处境,拓宽了在大国博弈中的回旋余地。

  普京全方位推进复兴战略

  当今世界,一度发展滞后的国家无不渴望崛起,中国和印度是这样,向来不甘久居人下的俄罗斯更是这样。

  2004年,普京以一系列举措向世人宣告俄罗斯迅速崛起的迫切愿望。

  首先,提出两大政治改革措施,以加强集权,提高效率。

  一是联邦主体(共和国、州、边疆区、自治区和直辖市)最高领导人将不再由选民直选,而是由地方立法机关根据联邦总统提名选出,以确保地方领导人受中央严密控制,使普京的治国方略能一贯到底;

  二是国家杜马代表不是像现在这样,一半席位由选区直选,另一半按进入国家杜马的各政党得票比例分配,而将全部根据政党得票比例产生,这将有助于总统通过政党控制议会,保证立法畅通无阻。

  其次,经济上加快发展,加强控制。

  普京执政5年来,俄GDP节节上升,按汇率计,2000年约2500亿美元,2003年为4330亿美元,2004年为5543亿美元,人均约4000美元;黄金外汇储备到去年底接近1200亿美元;职工月薪提高86.6%,达到6590卢布(29卢布约合1美元),退休金增长117%。

  为尽快实现强国目标,普京一再要求加快增长速度,并提出中长期目标:2010年GDP按不变价格计比2000年翻一番,如果按汇率计达1万亿美元,将比2000年翻两番;到2015年使人均GDP突破1万美元,达到经济强国的水平。

  普京通过打击石油寡头霍多尔科夫斯基及其尤科斯公司,断绝了财阀参政的门路,加强了对石油天然气和本国经济命脉的控制。

  其三,为减轻财政负担,体现效率和公正,普京下决心抛弃苏联留下的福利“大锅饭”,搞社会改革:今年起取消免费公交和疗养等约30项优惠,改发现金补贴;停止福利分房,居民贷款购房;水、电和燃气收费逐步提价,居民将百分之百承担住房公用事业费用;取消公费医疗,治病靠医保;退休者要靠在职时自我积累来改善晚年生活。

  其四,军事上停止收缩,谋求扩展。

  普京宣布,俄武装力量削减进程基本结束,开始从改革阶段转入发展阶段,要增强核遏制力量,并首次正式提出先发制人的战略。

  2004年俄在军事上有四大举动:举行了本国22年来最大的核军演,2/3正规军和1/3后备军参加;把驻塔吉克斯坦的201摩托化步兵师驻地改建为俄在境外最大的军事基地,加上去年在吉尔吉斯斯坦新启用的坎特空军基地,俄在独联体国家共有20余个军事基地;重新重视导弹核武器的作用,普京称,“一旦忽视国防力量中导弹核武器的发展,我们就会面临新的威胁”;2005年军费增长28%。

  考虑到石油将持续奇货可居,普京要充分利用得天独厚的资源条件,特别是油气等潜在价值达30万亿美元的矿产资源,以及世界上唯一兼石油出口国和核大国双重身份的优势,为早日崛起出力。

  然而,普京政治上一言九鼎,一呼百应,但集权过多,万一政局出乱子,将难辞其咎;官员腐败,效率低下;社会不公,贫富悬殊;苏联留下的落后产业结构未根本改善,经济增长过分依赖原料出口和能源高价;美国不许他国挑战其唯一超级大国地位,尤其容不得老对手俄罗斯重新崛起……由此可以判断,俄罗斯打造强国的道路将在博弈中充满坎坷。

more

China decides to share south China sea with Vienam and Philippine

中菲越三国南海协议区的共同开发合作实现突破
http://www.sina.com.cn 2005年08月27日10:23 中国新闻网

  中新社北京八月二十六日电 (记者 贾全欣) 中海油田服务股份有限公司(简称“中海油服”)中菲越联合地震工作协议实施暨滨海502船启航仪式今天在深圳举行。这标志着中、菲、越三国在南海争议海区的共同开发合作获得新进展。

  中海油服作为由中海油总公司控股的香港上市公司,此前,在由中、菲、越三国石油公司组织的中国南海协议区二维地震勘探投招标过程中,凭借自身在海上地震勘探的专业技术优势和丰富的经验,做出了详细得当的市场分析和投标策略,经过三国石油公司项目组专家的严格评审,以技术标、商务标评审最高得分,一举胜出。

  今年三月,来自三国的国家石油公司——中海油总公司、菲律宾国家石油公司和越南石油和天然气公司签署了《在南中国海协议区三方联合海洋地震工作协议》。根据协议,三家石油公司将联合在三年协议期内,收集南海协议区内定量二维和三维地震数据,并对区内现有的二维地震线进行处理。协议合作区总面积超过十四万平方公里。

  这次三方合作,是三方共同落实《南海各方行为宣言》的重要举措,它将使三国人民受益,并为本地区有关国家解决争议树立良好典范。

more

Friday, August 26, 2005

I guess China will be the next heaven of lesbian




The show of super voice gal is over now.
No one has believed the chinese version of "american idol" would have been so successful. More than 400 million chinese have watched super voice gal! You are right, 400,000,000!
One of my favorite singers in this show is Zhang LiangYing, yet her singing skill and voice are still not mature enough to be a super star. It is even more interesting that the champion went to the singer Li Yuchun, who virtually can't sing! Believe me, she can barely sing! However she won eventually!
What's the reason? At least currently every body has consensus that her neutral appearence and personal style helped a lot. By saying "neutral", I mean she actually looks like a man. The 2nd place was grabbed by a neutral looking singer as well! My favorite who-can-sing is only the No. 3. It is commonly believed that most of votes were casted by female fans. Now you may realized chinese female love neutral style women. Why?
Well, no theory yet. But the answer that I can come up with immediately is: they are disappointed by chinese men, because they don't usually pay much attention to the sensitive feeling of women as neutral women do.....haha...
Fortunately my wife don't like this show at all.....

By the way, perhaps I can answer a long-standing question of myself from what I read from super gal champion. I used to wonder why pop music in China is constantly wandering at a real low level of creativity. Now I guess it's all about the economy. Without a market which has ability to appreciate better music and better voices, businessmen won't even bother to invest any pioneer music writer. Basically there is no demand for a variety of music style in China. SO SAD! SO SAD!

For readers unfamilar with this show, Danwei is the best place to go.

Update: A fabulous quote stolen from simon's website:
How come an imitation of a democratic system ends up selecting the singer who has the least ability to carry a tune?
Of course he has stolen it from China Daily.

more

The local high school pregnancy rate amazing!

For the first time, I blog about something local. As a foreigner, I had no idea that there are so many high school pregnant students until I read the report: 65 Girls At Area School Pregnant below...

More:
"WEWS discovered that the non-Canton rate was 7 percent. Canton was 15 percent. Cleveland's rate is 20 percent!"

I guess Akron's rate must be 17.5%, because Akron locates right in the middle of Cleveland and Canton, ha... apparently having a baby will let them grow up overnight, isn't that their original purpose to have sex?

Well, not everything's as worried as the new above at Akron, at least we got Lebron James...I am expecting the next seaon of Cavalier...go go go!




65 Girls At Area School Pregnant
School To Unveil Three-Prong Program

UPDATED: 10:19 am EDT August 26, 2005

CANTON, Ohio -- There are 490 female students at Timken High School, and 65 are pregnant, NewsChannel5 reported.

Some would say that movies, TV, videogames, lazy parents and lax discipline may all be to blame.

School officials are not sure what has contributed to so many pregnancies, but in response to them, the school is launching a three-prong educational program to address pregnancy, prevention and parenting.

WEWS also reported that students will face mounting tensions created by unplanned child-rearing responsibilities, causing students to quit school and plan for a GED. This will make it difficult for the Canton City School District to shake its academic watch designation by the state.

According to the Canton Health Department, statistics through July show that 104 of the 586 babies born to Canton residents in Aultman Hospital and Mercy Medical Center had mothers between 11 and 19.


WEWS discovered that the non-Canton rate was 7 percent. Canton was 15 percent.


Cleveland's rate is 20 percent.

more

Here is my view on a post written by HK Dave in simonworld

The original post is here.
The title is "Chinese and Indian Models", the question was which is better?
Below is my answer:

Dave, I think that I agree with you on most of points.
But I don't think the comparison between India and China is fair enough. India had never been one united nation in history until the independence. I couldn’t imagine what will happen to China if we also have as many religions and languages as Indians have. Never mention they used to divide people in term of brahman, kshatriyas, vaisyas, sudras and harijan. Perhaps India never united culturally, while Chinese characters bond Chinese much more closely together than English does for India. Still China’s gotten localized capital flow and protectionism today, which are probably not so good for a market economy. Not to mention that dictatorship also has given China great starving period and culture revolution. Considering all these facts, I admire what India has done so far.
The famous local Hongkonger economist Steven Cheung doesn’t like democracy too much because he considers the transaction fee is too high for a business under the democracy. Of course he got tons of examples from today’s development in China. However if we jump up one level and focus on the big picture we found Steven Cheung’s theory need a very important prerequisite: a smart and benign dictator. Otherwise if count all social costs in the first 30 years of PRC as the transaction fee in his theory, he probably will lose all his pants.
Amartya Sen has an article called “Democracy as a Universal Value”, which has been very popular in China. I guess Sen is right unless Cheung comes up with some other mechanism to generate a smart and benign dictator, which probably is GOD.
Right now looks like China is doing better. However the nature of authoritarian regime decides that the economic development will be fast only if the governing group do things right, but the disaster will be huge in case the governing group do things wrong. That’s why I mentioned that perhaps we need at least another 50 years to tell which model is more successful. There is a possibility that we may never know which model is better. Consider the economic development under authoritarian regime is an upward wave with big fluctuations, (just like what Chicago boys did for Chili) while the economic development under the democratic regime is also upward wave but with only small fluctuations. (Botswana, a good example? I am not sure…) Only by averaging out the fluctuations for a big enough data set, we can get slopes and compare them. Apparently this may never be achieved in reality.

more

Thursday, August 25, 2005

张五常:民主是皇帝的新衣吗?

Read this article by Cheung and the next artile by Sen, so who is right and are their theories really conflicting each other?

作者:张五常 发表日期: 2005-5-9
东亚经济评论 http://www.e-economic.com 
整理自己的英语文章,重读一些早就遗忘了的小品,暗赞当年掷叶飞花,有黄药师的功力也。两篇短文触发本文动笔。

一篇是一九八三年十一月写下的,应一份欧洲学报的邀请,写好后忘记了寄出,跟着文稿遗失了,两年前找回来。几个月前高斯读后,认为重要。文章题目是《为什么共产制度缺少自由?》(Why is There a Lack of Freedom Under Communism?)似浅实深。可不是吗?自由永远是指局限约束下的自由,共产制度与私产制度是两种局限性质很不相同的制度,自由的性质因而有别,我们怎可以说在共产制度下的自由比不上或少于私产制度的呢?不是简单的问题!同学们怎样想呢?我在两个晚上想出答案,数小时完稿,同事C. D. Hall首先读到,频呼精彩。这里不说,让同学们猜猜吧。

提及该文,是文中提及「民主」我还客气。但第二篇短文,一九九八年发表的,我就不客气了,简直破口大骂。其实后者不是我写的。一九九七年七月,作为美国西区经济学会的会长,该会安排了一个关于共产制度改革的大话题,要求我这个老人家作三位年轻讲者的评论人。三位讲得掷地有声,高举民主改革,以人民投票为依归云云。我听得一肚火,大骂二十分钟,骂得整个大堂鸦雀无声。殊不知这大骂被录了音,一家学报的编辑笔录下来,要求容许发表。我修改了一下,该学报就刊登了。编辑替我起了一个古怪的长名目,翻过来的大意是:民主是改革共产经济的诅咒。


观点清楚明确。我说如果问经济学者民主好不好,多半会说好、好、好。问投票好不好,多半不敢响应。但如果投票不是民主,没有人可以告诉我民主是什么。我们怎可以用不知是什么的来改革呢?制度是以权利的界定方法划分,知道的只有三种。其一是以人的等级界定权利(共产制度),其二是以管制法例界定权利(印度之路),其三是以资产界定权利(私产制度)。大家都同意共产制度的改革是要从以等级界定权利转到以资产界定权利那边去。投票可以投得这效果吗?相信的是作白日梦,发神经。投票永远是为自己的利益而投,而不管怎样说,舍己为民的政客说的多,做到的我没有遇到过。投票改革只可能投得管制法例丛生的后果。

三位讲者听后,两位脸黑黑,但一位站起来,直言自己讲的全盘错了。散会后我对认错的年轻教授说,改革共产制度,从一种权利界定改为另一种权利界定,难于登天,既得利益分子的反对不容易处理,而投票会有众多利益团体跑出来,于是天下大乱矣。独裁有独裁的问题,但好处是交易费用低。在投票改革与独裁改革这二者的选择上,要赌一手,下注不困难。不是说独裁改革一定成功,而是投票改革一定失败。我跟着举出东欧几个国家的例子,说他们都犯了投票改革的严重错失。

民主这个模糊概念,十七世纪之前被学者鄙视。十八世纪美国的华盛顿与杰弗逊总统,大智大慧,把「民主」翻案,促成今天一般人模糊地认为民主神圣不可侵犯。华盛顿与杰弗逊是伟大的,但我怀疑他们当时真的知道自己是做什么。这样说,是因为美国宪法的权利法案要到立宪后两年才加上去。州立的宪法早就有权利法案,但初立联邦宪法之际他们忘记了。是补加的权利法案使美国的民主宪政发扬光大的。从维护个人权利入手,票不可以乱投,你的钱就不容易被投到我的袋中去。话虽如此,价格管制、租金管制、社会福利等措施,以我们今天所知私产定义衡量,皆属违宪。另一方面,美国宪法的成功,把民主一词放进了圣殿,反对的人不敢大声说出来。

「民主」一词是democracy的中译。译得对吗?只有天晓得。模糊不清的概念,不可能说是对还是错。一家四口去看电影,天伦之乐,要大家一起看。父亲要看甲,儿女要看乙,老父坚持己见,满脸怒容,儿女乖乖听命——这是独裁。老父转了性,征求意见,认为自己是少数,陪着儿女去看自己会睡觉的——这是民主。

清楚吗?不一定。二十多年前在港大作讲座教授兼系主任,公事繁忙,驾车进校园往往找不到泊车位,要求校方让我出钱租车位,不用排队。校方否决了。为此事我向一位经济系外的教师投诉,他说:「想不到香港大学竟然是那样民主的!」我忍着怒气,轻声说:「校方民主,但我独裁。我对校长说如果每月不给我加薪一万元聘请司机,我不干。他加了。只要让我自己出一千元租车位就可以解决问题,但现在是社会每月浪费一万,校方进帐少了一万一千。」

曾经说过,如果民主是指以人民的意向为主,那么市场是最民主的地方。市场投的是钞票,不是选票,大家让钞票的多少表达,不是人民的意向是什么?一九六八年在芝加哥大学与夏保加谈及阿罗的难能定律(Impossibility Theorem),我说如果选票可以在市场自由买卖,价高者得,那么难能定律就不能成立了。夏保加立刻同意,说要找阿罗谈谈这一怪招。当然,容许选票在市场自由买卖,会有好些人反对,不容易接受。

这就带到一个严重的问题。你说民主是投选票之外的什么我多半不会反对,但如果说是投选票,我会头痛得叫救命。投钞票的市场要基于私产的局限界定,高斯定律是也。投选票呢?除了上述的一家四口选看电影的那类例子,一般是削弱私产的权利,要否决市场。美国宪法的权利法案是协助解决这二者的矛盾。但高明如美国还出现了那么多问题,其它国家又怎样搞他们的投票民主了?

我是个胆小的人。学术生涯数十年,没有胆量说半句自己不相信的话。撇开了投选票,我不知道民主是什么。不知道的学问,无从反对,也无从支持。今天高举民主的君子们是高举投选票,不管权利法案怎样写。奇怪是他们不像是反对市场。难道他们是看到我看不到的皇帝的新衣吗?

二○○五年五月五日

more

Democracy as a Universal Value


Democracy as a Universal Value
Amartya Sen
In the summer of 1997, I was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what I thought was the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century. I found this to be an unusually thought-provoking question, since so many things of gravity have happened over the last hundred years. The European empires, especially the British and French ones that had so dominated the nineteenth century, came to an end. We witnessed two world wars. We saw the rise and fall of fascism and Nazism. The century witnessed the rise of communism, and its fall (as in the former Soviet bloc) or radical transformation (as in China). We also saw a shift from the economic dominance of the West to a new economic balance much more dominated by Japan and East and Southeast Asia. Even though that region is going through some financial and economic problems right now, this is not going to nullify the shift in the balance of the world economy that has occurred over many decades (in the case of Japan, through nearly the entire century). The past hundred years are not lacking in important events.

Nevertheless, among the great variety of developments that have occurred in the twentieth century, I did not, ultimately, have any difficulty in choosing one as the preeminent development of the period: the rise of democracy. This is not to deny that other occurrences have [End Page 3] also been important, but I would argue that in the distant future, when people look back at what happened in this century, they will find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.

The idea of democracy originated, of course, in ancient Greece, more than two millennia ago. Piecemeal efforts at democratization were attempted elsewhere as well, including in India.1 But it is really in ancient Greece that the idea of democracy took shape and was seriously put into practice (albeit on a limited scale), before it collapsed and was replaced by more authoritarian and asymmetric forms of government. There were no other kinds anywhere else.

Thereafter, democracy as we know it took a long time to emerge. Its gradual--and ultimately triumphant--emergence as a working system of governance was bolstered by many developments, from the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, to the French and the American Revolutions in the eighteenth century, to the widening of the franchise in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century. It was in the twentieth century, however, that the idea of democracy became established as the "normal" form of government to which any nation is entitled--whether in Europe, America, Asia, or Africa.

The idea of democracy as a universal commitment is quite new, and it is quintessentially a product of the twentieth century. The rebels who forced restraint on the king of England through the Magna Carta saw the need as an entirely local one. In contrast, the American fighters for independence and the revolutionaries in France contributed greatly to an understanding of the need for democracy as a general system. Yet the focus of their practical demands remained quite local--confined, in effect, to the two sides of the North Atlantic, and founded on the special economic, social, and political history of the region.

Throughout the nineteenth century, theorists of democracy found it quite natural to discuss whether one country or another was "fit for democracy." This thinking changed only in the twentieth century, with the recognition that the question itself was wrong: A country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy. This is indeed a momentous change, extending the potential reach of democracy to cover billions of people, with their varying histories and cultures and disparate levels of affluence.

It was also in this century that people finally accepted that "franchise for all adults" must mean all--not just men but also women. When in January of this year I had the opportunity to meet Ruth Dreyfuss, the president of Switzerland and a woman of remarkable distinction, it gave me occasion to recollect that only a quarter century ago Swiss women could not even vote. We have at last reached the point of recognizing that the coverage of universality, like the quality of mercy, is not strained. [End Page 4]

I do not deny that there are challenges to democracy's claim to universality. These challenges come in many shapes and forms--and from different directions. Indeed, that is part of the subject of this essay. I have to examine the claim of democracy as a universal value and the disputes that surround that claim. Before I begin that exercise, however, it is necessary to grasp clearly the sense in which democracy has become a dominant belief in the contemporary world.

In any age and social climate, there are some sweeping beliefs that seem to command respect as a kind of general rule--like a "default" setting in a computer program; they are considered right unless their claim is somehow precisely negated. While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed uniformly accepted, in the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right. The ball is very much in the court of those who want to rubbish democracy to provide justification for that rejection.

This is a historic change from not very long ago, when the advocates of democracy for Asia or Africa had to argue for democracy with their backs to the wall. While we still have reason enough to dispute those who, implicitly or explicitly, reject the need for democracy, we must also note clearly how the general climate of opinion has shifted from what it was in previous centuries. We do not have to establish afresh, each time, whether such and such a country (South Africa, or Cambodia, or Chile) is "fit for democracy" (a question that was prominent in the discourse of the nineteenth century); we now take that for granted. This recognition of democracy as a universally relevant system, which moves in the direction of its acceptance as a universal value, is a major revolution in thinking, and one of the main contributions of the twentieth century. It is in this context that we have to examine the question of democracy as a universal value.

The Indian Experience
How well has democracy worked? While no one really questions the role of democracy in, say, the United States or Britain or France, it is still a matter of dispute for many of the poorer countries in the world. This is not the occasion for a detailed examination of the historical record, but I would argue that democracy has worked well enough.

India, of course, was one of the major battlegrounds of this debate. In denying Indians independence, the British expressed anxiety over the Indians' ability to govern themselves. India was indeed in some disarray in 1947, the year it became independent. It had an untried government, an undigested partition, and unclear political alignments, combined with widespread communal violence and social disorder. It was hard to have faith in the future of a united and democratic India. [End Page 5] And yet, half a century later, we find a democracy that has, taking the rough with the smooth, worked remarkably well. Political differences have been largely tackled within the constitutional guidelines, and governments have risen and fallen according to electoral and parliamentary rules. An ungainly, unlikely, inelegant combination of differences, India nonetheless survives and functions remarkably well as a political unit with a democratic system. Indeed, it is held together by its working democracy.

India has also survived the tremendous challenge of dealing with a variety of major languages and a spectrum of religions. Religious and communal differences are, of course, vulnerable to exploitation by sectarian politicians, and have indeed been so used on several occasions (including in recent months), causing massive consternation in the country. Yet the fact that consternation greets sectarian violence and that condemnation of such violence comes from all sections of the country ultimately provides the main democratic guarantee against the narrowly factional exploitation of sectarianism. This is, of course, essential for the survival and prosperity of a country as remarkably varied as India, which is home not only to a Hindu majority, but to the world's third largest Muslim population, to millions of Christians and Buddhists, and to most of the world's Sikhs, Parsees, and Jains.

Democracy and Economic Development
It is often claimed that nondemocratic systems are better at bringing about economic development. This belief sometimes goes by the name of "the Lee hypothesis," due to its advocacy by Lee Kuan Yew, the leader and former president of Singapore. He is certainly right that some disciplinarian states (such as South Korea, his own Singapore, and postreform China) have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarian ones (including India, Jamaica, and Costa Rica). The "Lee hypothesis," however, is based on sporadic empiricism, drawing on very selective and limited information, rather than on any general statistical testing over the wide-ranging data that are available. A general relation of this kind cannot be established on the basis of very selective evidence. For example, we cannot really take the high economic growth of Singapore or China as "definitive proof" that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth, any more than we can draw the opposite conclusion from the fact that Botswana, the country with the best record of economic growth in Africa, indeed with one of the finest records of economic growth in the whole world, has been an oasis of democracy on that continent over the decades. We need more systematic empirical studies to sort out the claims and counterclaims.

There is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian [End Page 6] governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to economic development. Indeed, the general statistical picture does not permit any such induction. Systematic empirical studies (for example, by Robert Barro or by Adam Przeworski) give no real support to the claim that there is a general conflict between political rights and economic performance.2 The directional linkage seems to depend on many other circumstances, and while some statistical investigations note a weakly negative relation, others find a strongly positive one. If all the comparative studies are viewed together, the hypothesis that there is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in either direction remains extremely plausible. Since democracy and political liberty have importance in themselves, the case for them therefore remains untarnished.3

The question also involves a fundamental issue of methods of economic research. We must not only look at statistical connections, but also examine and scrutinize the causal processes that are involved in economic growth and development. The economic policies and circumstances that led to the economic success of countries in East Asia are by now reasonably well understood. While different empirical studies have varied in emphasis, there is by now broad consensus on a list of "helpful policies" that includes openness to competition, the use of international markets, public provision of incentives for investment and export, a high level of literacy and schooling, successful land reforms, and other social opportunities that widen participation in the process of economic expansion. There is no reason at all to assume that any of these policies is inconsistent with greater democracy and had to be forcibly sustained by the elements of authoritarianism that happened to be present in South Korea or Singapore or China. Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence to show that what is needed for generating faster economic growth is a friendlier economic climate rather than a harsher political system.

To complete this examination, we must go beyond the narrow confines of economic growth and scrutinize the broader demands of economic development, including the need for economic and social security. In that context, we have to look at the connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the prevention of major economic disasters, on the other. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to demand appropriate public action. The response of a government to the acute suffering of its people often depends on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political rights (such as voting, criticizing, protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the political incentives that operate on a government.

I have discussed elsewhere the remarkable fact that, in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred [End Page 7] in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.4 We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where we look: the recent famines of Ethiopia, Somalia, or other dictatorial regimes; famines in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; China's 1958-61 famine with the failure of the Great Leap Forward; or earlier still, the famines in Ireland or India under alien rule. China, although it was in many ways doing much better economically than India, still managed (unlike India) to have a famine, indeed the largest recorded famine in world history: Nearly 30 million people died in the famine of 1958-61, while faulty governmental policies remained uncorrected for three full years. The policies went uncriticized because there were no opposition parties in parliament, no free press, and no multiparty elections. Indeed, it is precisely this lack of challenge that allowed the deeply defective policies to continue even though they were killing millions each year. The same can be said about the world's two contemporary famines, occurring right now in North Korea and Sudan.

Famines are often associated with what look like natural disasters, and commentators often settle for the simplicity of explaining famines by pointing to these events: the floods in China during the failed Great Leap Forward, the droughts in Ethiopia, or crop failures in North Korea. Nevertheless, many countries with similar natural problems, or even worse ones, manage perfectly well, because a responsive government intervenes to help alleviate hunger. Since the primary victims of a famine are the indigent, deaths can be prevented by recreating incomes (for example, through employment programs), which makes food accessible to potential famine victims. Even the poorest democratic countries that have faced terrible droughts or floods or other natural disasters (such as India in 1973, or Zimbabwe and Botswana in the early 1980s) have been able to feed their people without experiencing a famine.

Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so, and a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers, cannot help but make such an effort. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (the last famine, which I witnessed as a child, was in 1943, four years before independence), they disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press.

I have discussed these issues elsewhere, particularly in my joint work with Jean Dr'eze, so I will not dwell further on them here.5 Indeed, the issue of famine is only one example of the reach of democracy, though it is, in many ways, the easiest case to analyze. The positive role of political and civil rights applies to the prevention of economic and social disasters in general. When things go fine and everything is routinely good, this instrumental role of democracy may not be particularly missed. It is when things get fouled up, for one [End Page 8] reason or another, that the political incentives provided by democratic governance acquire great practical value.

There is, I believe, an important lesson here. Many economic technocrats recommend the use of economic incentives (which the market system provides) while ignoring political incentives (which democratic systems could guarantee). This is to opt for a deeply unbalanced set of ground rules. The protective power of democracy may not be missed much when a country is lucky enough to be facing no serious calamity, when everything is going quite smoothly. Yet the danger of insecurity, arising from changed economic or other circumstances, or from uncorrected mistakes of policy, can lurk behind what looks like a healthy state.

The recent problems of East and Southeast Asia bring out, among other things, the penalties of undemocratic governance. This is so in two striking respects. First, the development of the financial crisis in some of these economies (including South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia) has been closely linked to the lack of transparency in business, in particular the lack of public participation in reviewing financial arrangements. The absence of an effective democratic forum has been central to this failing. Second, once the financial crisis led to a general economic recession, the protective power of democracy--not unlike that which prevents famines in democratic countries--was badly missed in a country like Indonesia. The newly dispossessed did not have the hearing they needed.

A fall in total gross national product of, say, 10 percent may not look like much if it follows in the wake of a growth rate of 5 or 10 percent every year over the past few decades, and yet that decline can decimate lives and create misery for millions if the burden of contraction is not widely shared but allowed to be heaped on those--the unemployed or the economically redundant--who can least bear it. The vulnerable in Indonesia may not have missed democracy when things went up and up, but that lacuna kept their voice low and muffled as the unequally shared crisis developed. The protective role of democracy is strongly missed when it is most needed.

The Functions of Democracy
I have so far allowed the agenda of this essay to be determined by the critics of democracy, especially the economic critics. I shall return to criticisms again, taking up the arguments of the cultural critics in particular, but the time has come for me to pursue further the positive analysis of what democracy does and what may lie at the base of its claim to be a universal value.

What exactly is democracy? We must not identify democracy with majority rule. Democracy has complex demands, which certainly [End Page 9] include voting and respect for election results, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment. Even elections can be deeply defective if they occur without the different sides getting an adequate opportunity to present their respective cases, or without the electorate enjoying the freedom to obtain news and to consider the views of the competing protagonists. Democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation.

Viewed in this light, the merits of democracy and its claim as a universal value can be related to certain distinct virtues that go with its unfettered practice. Indeed, we can distinguish three different ways in which democracy enriches the lives of the citizens. First, political freedom is a part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings. Political and social participation has intrinsic value for human life and well-being. To be prevented from participation in the political life of the community is a major deprivation.

Second, as I have just discussed (in disputing the claim that democracy is in tension with economic development), democracy has an important instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including claims of economic needs). Third--and this is a point to be explored further--the practice of democracy gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form its values and priorities. Even the idea of "needs," including the understanding of "economic needs," requires public discussion and exchange of information, views, and analyses. In this sense, democracy has constructive importance, in addition to its intrinsic value for the lives of the citizens and its instrumental importance in political decisions. The claims of democracy as a universal value have to take note of this diversity of considerations.

The conceptualization--even comprehension--of what are to count as "needs," including "economic needs," may itself require the exercise of political and civil rights. A proper understanding of what economic needs are--their content and their force--may require discussion and exchange. Political and civil rights, especially those related to the guaranteeing of open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, are central to the process of generating informed and considered choices. These processes are crucial to the formation of values and priorities, and we cannot, in general, take preferences as given independently of public discussion, that is, irrespective of whether open interchange and debate are permitted or not.

In fact, the reach and effectiveness of open dialogue are often underestimated in assessing social and political problems. For example, [End Page 10] public discussion has an important role to play in reducing the high rates of fertility that characterize many developing countries. There is substantial evidence that the sharp decline in fertility rates in India's more literate states has been much influenced by public discussion of the bad effects of high fertility rates on the community at large, and especially on the lives of young women. If the view has emerged in, say, the Indian state of Kerala or of Tamil Nadu that a happy family in the modern age is a small family, much discussion and debate have gone into the formation of these perspectives. Kerala now has a fertility rate of 1.7 (similar to that of Britain and France, and well below China's 1.9), and this has been achieved with no coercion, but mainly through the emergence of new values--a process in which political and social dialogue has played a major part. Kerala's high literacy rate (it ranks higher in literacy than any province in China), especially among women, has greatly contributed to making such social and political dialogue possible.

Miseries and deprivations can be of various kinds, some more amenable to social remedies than others. The totality of the human predicament would be a gross basis for identifying our "needs." For example, there are many things that we might have good reason to value and thus could be taken as "needs" if they were feasible. We could even want immortality, as Maitreyee, that remarkable inquiring mind in the Upanishads, famously did in her 3000-year old conversation with Yajnvalkya. But we do not see immortality as a "need" because it is clearly unfeasible. Our conception of needs relates to our ideas of the preventable nature of some deprivations and to our understanding of what can be done about them. In the formation of understandings and beliefs about feasibility (particularly, social feasibility), public discussions play a crucial role. Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves.

Universality of Values
If the above analysis is correct, then democracy's claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit. There is a plurality of virtues here, including, first, the intrinsic importance of political participation and freedom in human life; second, the instrumental importance of political incentives in keeping governments responsible and accountable; and third, the constructive role of democracy in the formation of values and in the understanding of needs, rights, and duties. In the light of this diagnosis, we may now address the motivating question of this essay, namely the case for seeing democracy as a universal value. [End Page 11]

In disputing this claim, it is sometimes argued that not everyone agrees on the decisive importance of democracy, particularly when it competes with other desirable things for our attention and loyalty. This is indeed so, and there is no unanimity here. This lack of unanimity is seen by some as sufficient evidence that democracy is not a universal value.

Clearly, we must begin by dealing with a methodological question: What is a universal value? For a value to be considered universal, must it have the consent of everyone? If that were indeed necessary, then the category of universal values might well be empty. I know of no value--not even motherhood (I think of Mommie Dearest)--to which no one has ever objected. I would argue that universal consent is not required for something to be a universal value. Rather, the claim of a universal value is that people anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable.

When Mahatma Gandhi argued for the universal value of non-violence, he was not arguing that people everywhere already acted according to this value, but rather that they had good reason to see it as valuable. Similarly, when Rabindranath Tagore argued for "the freedom of the mind" as a universal value, he was not saying that this claim is accepted by all, but that all do have reason enough to accept it--a reason that he did much to explore, present, and propagate.6 Understood in this way, any claim that something is a universal value involves some counterfactual analysis--in particular, whether people might see some value in a claim that they have not yet considered adequately. All claims to universal value--not just that of democracy--have this implicit presumption.

I would argue that it is with regard to this often implicit presumption that the biggest attitudinal shift toward democracy has occurred in the twentieth century. In considering democracy for a country that does not have it and where many people may not yet have had the opportunity to consider it for actual practice, it is now presumed that the people involved would approve of it once it becomes a reality in their lives. In the nineteenth century this assumption typically would have not been made, but the presumption that is taken to be natural (what I earlier called the "default" position) has changed radically during the twentieth century.

It must also be noted that this change is, to a great extent, based on observing the history of the twentieth century. As democracy has spread, its adherents have grown, not shrunk. Starting off from Europe and America, democracy as a system has reached very many distant shores, where it has been met with willing participation and acceptance. Moreover, when an existing democracy has been overthrown, there have been widespread protests, even though these protests have often been brutally suppressed. Many people have been willing to risk their lives in the fight to bring back democracy. [End Page 12]

Some who dispute the status of democracy as a universal value base their argument not on the absence of unanimity, but on the presence of regional contrasts. These alleged contrasts are sometimes related to the poverty of some nations. According to this argument, poor people are interested, and have reason to be interested, in bread, not in democracy. This oft-repeated argument is fallacious at two different levels.

First, as discussed above, the protective role of democracy may be particularly important for the poor. This obviously applies to potential famine victims who face starvation. It also applies to the destitute thrown off the economic ladder in a financial crisis. People in economic need also need a political voice. Democracy is not a luxury that can await the arrival of general prosperity.

Second, there is very little evidence that poor people, given the choice, prefer to reject democracy. It is thus of some interest to note that when an erstwhile Indian government in the mid-1970s tried out a similar argument to justify the alleged "emergency" (and the suppression of various political and civil rights) that it had declared, an election was called that divided the voters precisely on this issue. In that fateful election, fought largely on this one overriding theme, the suppression of basic political and civil rights was firmly rejected, and the Indian electorate--one of the poorest in the world--showed itself to be no less keen on protesting against the denial of basic liberties and rights than on complaining about economic deprivation.

To the extent that there has been any testing of the proposition that the poor do not care about civil and political rights, the evidence is entirely against that claim. Similar points can be made by observing the struggle for democratic freedoms in South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Asia. Similarly, while political freedom is widely denied in Africa, there have been movements and protests against such repression whenever circumstances have permitted them.

The Argument from Cultural Differences
There is also another argument in defense of an allegedly fundamental regional contrast, one related not to economic circumstances but to cultural differences. Perhaps the most famous of these claims relates to what have been called "Asian values." It has been claimed that Asians traditionally value discipline, not political freedom, and thus the attitude to democracy must inevitably be much more skeptical in these countries. I have discussed this thesis in some detail in my Morganthau Memorial Lecture at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.7

It is very hard to find any real basis for this intellectual claim in the history of Asian cultures, especially if we look at the classical [End Page 13] traditions of India, the Middle East, Iran, and other parts of Asia. For example, one of the earliest and most emphatic statements advocating the tolerance of pluralism and the duty of the state to protect minorities can be found in the inscriptions of the Indian emperor Ashoka in the third century B.C.

Asia is, of course, a very large area, containing 60 percent of the world's population, and generalizations about such a vast set of peoples is not easy. Sometimes the advocates of "Asian values" have tended to look primarily at East Asia as the region of particular applicability. The general thesis of a contrast between the West and Asia often concentrates on the lands to the east of Thailand, even though there is also a more ambitious claim that the rest of Asia is rather "similar." Lee Kuan Yew, to whom we must be grateful for being such a clear expositor (and for articulating fully what is often stated vaguely in this tangled literature), outlines "the fundamental difference between Western concepts of society and government and East Asian concepts" by explaining, "when I say East Asians, I mean Korea, Japan, China, Vietnam, as distinct from Southeast Asia, which is a mix between the Sinic and the Indian, though Indian culture itself emphasizes similar values."8

Even East Asia itself, however, is remarkably diverse, with many variations to be found not only among Japan, China, Korea, and other countries of the region, but also within each country. Confucius is the standard author quoted in interpreting Asian values, but he is not the only intellectual influence in these countries (in Japan, China, and Korea for example, there are very old and very widespread Buddhist traditions, powerful for over a millennium and a half, and there are also other influences, including a considerable Christian presence). There is no homogeneous worship of order over freedom in any of these cultures.

Furthermore, Confucius himself did not recommend blind allegiance to the state. When Zilu asks him "how to serve a prince," Confucius replies (in a statement that the censors of authoritarian regimes may want to ponder), "Tell him the truth even if it offends him."9 Confucius is not averse to practical caution and tact, but does not forgo the recommendation to oppose a bad government (tactfully, if necessary): "When the [good] way prevails in the state, speak boldly and act boldly. When the state has lost the way, act boldly and speak softly."10

Indeed, Confucius provides a clear pointer to the fact that the two pillars of the imagined edifice of Asian values, loyalty to family and obedience to the state, can be in severe conflict with each other. Many advocates of the power of "Asian values" see the role of the state as an extension of the role of the family, but as Confucius noted, there can be tension between the two. The Governor of She told Confucius, [End Page 14] "Among my people, there is a man of unbending integrity: when his father stole a sheep, he denounced him." To this Confucius replied, "Among my people, men of integrity do things differently: a father covers up for his son, a son covers up for his father--and there is integrity in what they do."11

The monolithic interpretation of Asian values as hostile to democracy and political rights does not bear critical scrutiny. I should not, I suppose, be too critical of the lack of scholarship supporting these beliefs, since those who have made these claims are not scholars but political leaders, often official or unofficial spokesmen for authoritarian governments. It is, however, interesting to see that while we academics can be impractical about practical politics, practical politicians can, in turn, be rather impractical about scholarship.

It is not hard, of course, to find authoritarian writings within the Asian traditions. But neither is it hard to find them in Western classics: One has only to reflect on the writings of Plato or Aquinas to see that devotion to discipline is not a special Asian taste. To dismiss the plausibility of democracy as a universal value because of the presence of some Asian writings on discipline and order would be similar to rejecting the plausibility of democracy as a natural form of government in Europe or America today on the basis of the writings of Plato or Aquinas (not to mention the substantial medieval literature in support of the Inquisitions).

Due to the experience of contemporary political battles, especially in the Middle East, Islam is often portrayed as fundamentally intolerant of and hostile to individual freedom. But the presence of diversity and variety within a tradition applies very much to Islam as well. In India, Akbar and most of the other Moghul emperors (with the notable exception of Aurangzeb) provide good examples of both the theory and practice of political and religious tolerance. The Turkish emperors were often more tolerant than their European contemporaries. Abundant examples can also be found among rulers in Cairo and Baghdad. Indeed, in the twelfth century, the great Jewish scholar Maimonides had to run away from an intolerant Europe (where he was born), and from its persecution of Jews, to the security of a tolerant and urbane Cairo and the patronage of Sultan Saladin.

Diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception. The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and particularly in the last century or so. To read in this a historical commitment of the West--over the millennia--to democracy, and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions (treating each as monolithic) would be a great mistake. This tendency toward oversimplification can be seen not only in the writings of some governmental spokesmen [End Page 15] in Asia, but also in the theories of some of the finest Western scholars themselves.

As an example from the writings of a major scholar whose works, in many other ways, have been totally impressive, let me cite Samuel Huntington's thesis on the clash of civilizations, where the heterogeneities within each culture get quite inadequate recognition. His study comes to the clear conclusion that "a sense of individualism and a tradition of rights and liberties" can be found in the West that are "unique among civilized societies."12 Huntington also argues that "the central characteristics of the West, those which distinguish it from other civilizations, antedate the modernization of the West." In his view, "The West was West long before it was modern."13 It is this thesis that--I have argued--does not survive historical scrutiny.

For every attempt by an Asian government spokesman to contrast alleged "Asian values" with alleged Western ones, there is, it seems, an attempt by a Western intellectual to make a similar contrast from the other side. But even though every Asian pull may be matched by a Western push, the two together do not really manage to dent democracy's claim to be a universal value.

Where the Debate Belongs
I have tried to cover a number of issues related to the claim that democracy is a universal value. The value of democracy includes its intrinsic importance in human life, its instrumental role in generating political incentives, and its constructive function in the formation of values (and in understanding the force and feasibility of claims of needs, rights, and duties). These merits are not regional in character. Nor is the advocacy of discipline or order. Heterogeneity of values seems to characterize most, perhaps all, major cultures. The cultural argument does not foreclose, nor indeed deeply constrain, the choices we can make today.

Those choices have to be made here and now, taking note of the functional roles of democracy, on which the case for democracy in the contemporary world depends. I have argued that this case is indeed strong and not regionally contingent. The force of the claim that democracy is a universal value lies, ultimately, in that strength. That is where the debate belongs. It cannot be disposed of by imagined cultural taboos or assumed civilizational predispositions imposed by our various pasts.

Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics, is Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Lamont University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University. The following essay is based on a keynote address that he delivered at a February 1999 conference in New Delhi on "Building a Worldwide Movement for Democracy," cosponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy, the Confederation of Indian Industry, and the Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi). This essay draws on work more fully presented in his book Development as Freedom, to be published by Alfred Knopf later this year.

Notes
1. In Aldous Huxley's novel Point Counter Point, this was enough to give an adequate excuse to a cheating husband, who tells his wife that he must go to London to study democracy in ancient India in the library of the British Museum, while in reality he goes to see his mistress.

2. Adam Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert J. Barro, Getting It Right: Markets and Choices in a Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

3. I have examined the empirical evidence and causal connections in some detail in my book Development as Freedom, forthcoming from Knopf in 1999.

4. See my "Development: Which Way Now?" Economic Journal 93 (December 1983); Resources, Values, and Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and my "Rationality and Social Choice," presidential address to the American Economic Association, published in American Economic Review in March 1995. See also Jean Dr'eze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Frances D'Souza, ed., Starving in Silence: A Report on Famine and Censorship (London: Article 19 International Centre on Censorship, 1990); Human Rights Watch, Indivisible Human Rights: The Relationship between Political and Civil Rights to Survival, Subsistence and Poverty (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992); and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disaster Report 1994 (Geneva: Red Cross, 1994).

5. Dr'eze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action.

6. See my "Tagore and His India," New York Review of Books, 26 June 1997.

7. Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values," Morgenthau Memorial Lecture (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997), published in a shortened form in The New Republic, 14-21 July 1997.

8. Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs 73 (March-April 1994): 113.

9. The Analects of Confucius, Simon Leys, trans. (New York: Norton, 1997), 14.22, 70.

10. The Analects of Confucius, 14.3, 66.

11. The Analects of Confucius, 13.18, 63.

12. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 71.

13. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 69.

more

第三种视角看企业政府所有制:一种过渡性制度安排

我们现在的制度环境离理想状态还相差甚远,在这种情况下,有些非常规的制度安排作为一种过渡形式有一定的次优道理(second best)。在由计划向市场的转轨期间,不仅仅市场制度,而且政府体制,都是不完善的。在相当长的一个时间内,可能十年、二十年内,政府和市场的制度都将在不停地演变。因此,制度失灵,包括市场失灵和政府失灵两方面,就使得非常规形式的企业的政府所有和控制有它的一定的道理。这只是一个基本原理,重要的是要研究其中的具体机制是什么.

While Steven Cheung hates SOEs! I agree with Qian, because his theory sounds more practical, while Steven Cheung probably hasn't heard the sad experience of Chicago boys in Chili yet...or because he hasn't read anymore, haha...I like Qian's point for another reason. I have been in academia for years. My personal training basically is a crossover of organic chemistry, chemical engineering, and condense matter physics. Steven Cheung is a very complex figure, from one side, due to his training, he looks like theorists in physics, who can never win in the real world. But he hasn't paid attention to the math recently, thus more and more rely on his experience. From this side, he look like organic chemists, who usually work things out at the huge cost of money, time and manpower. While Qian look like chemical engineer, who usually adopts practical approach. That's what I like! We need Cheung as a poineer, and Qian as an operator!

第三种视角看企业政府所有制.一种过渡性制度安排
钱颖一
我在这里探讨一个转轨经济学的问题。在国外,一方面不少人对中国向市场经济的转轨经历很感兴趣,另一方面又对这方面的研究很欠缺,这是件很遗憾的事。中国的转轨是二十世纪末在世界范围内有重大影响的事件之一。这么有深远意义的事情,却没有现成的理论解释。经济学的现有理论对比较完善的经济制度有很好的描述和研究,对传统的计划经济也有很多的研究,但对如何从一种经济制度转轨到另一种经济制度,可以说就没有很好的理论了。这里面有许多非常丰富的经济现象值得探讨,经济理论值得开创。我的兴趣是希望用现代经济学的工具来分析中国在转轨过程中的经济现象。这里有很多方面,我在此讲一个方面,就是关于企业,特别是企业所有制。企业的所有制和控制权,都是热门话题,也是老生常谈的问题,似乎该说的都说过了。但是,用现代经济学的工具来分析,还是有意义的。
一、三种视角看企业的政府所有制

一个企业,所有者和控制者应该是政府还是私人,有三种观点。第一种观点,按照传统的“市场失灵”的思路,在一些市场失灵的情况下,政府对企业的所有和控制有它的好处,因为政府被认为会使社会效益最大化。比如,政府可以纠正一个企业的垄断行为,如果把企业让私人控制,私人的利益与社会的利益就会有冲突。又比如,当企业的经济活动有外部性时(比如排污行为),企业由私人运作,虽然利润高但社会效益低。这种观点认为,政府控制企业可以纠正市场失灵。原因是政府是代表社会利益的,不追求利润目标。所以某些行业的一些企业由政府控制的话,社会效益会好。这是一种传统的、教科书的观点。第二种观点,最近一、二十年比较流行,是说政府都是腐败的,政府控制的企业都是坏的。亚洲金融危机后,这种观点认为,这都是政府参与了企业的结果,是“裙带资本主义”的后果。所有权应给私人,私有制给人以激励,市场可以把资产分配到最优。哪怕有一些垄断的问题,外部性的问题,也比把企业给政府要好。政府的官员都是政客、官僚,他们的目标函数不是资产增值,有其它目的,直接受贿赂只是一个例子。这两种观点的对比很鲜明:根据第一种观点,政府在某些行业对某些企业的控制是应该的,而第二种观点说不应该,应该尽快私有化。
我想提出第三种观点,它基于中国过去二十年的实践。前两种观点包含了一些隐含的假定,对一些象我们这样的转轨经济和发展中经济的制度来说,并不切实际。来看第一种观点。政府真的就是为了社会的福利最大化吗?在很多情况下不是这样的。而且第一种观点只是讨论市场中的垄断问题或外部性问题,而没有考虑到发展中国家中更为严重的制度失灵因素。第二种观点是假定了某种理想的市场制度环境。这种环境,在发达国家,象美国、西欧,是经过了一、二百年才形成的。比如,对政府的各种各样的制约,不仅有民主,还有法治、政府部门间的制衡,法庭的清廉、公正。政府也不能随便地增加税,需要经过复杂的议会程序。所以,这些经济有一整套支持市场运作,保护产权的制度。在这种制度下,的确很难看到政府控制企业的好处。但如果用这样的制度环境的观点来分析发展中国家特别是象我们这样的转轨国家,有很多制度安排就不好解释了。
关于政府对企业的所有和控制问题,我提出“过渡性制度安排”的观点。这一观点包括了三层含义。第一层含义是说,在一个比较健全的市场制度的环境下(包括法治、对政府的约束、对产权的保护等),政府对企业的所有和控制是没有优势的,但有相当多的劣势。第二层含义是说,在转轨期间很多的制度环境相当的不完善,比如法治的建设、财产的保护、税收制度、金融监管等等。而这种不完善不会一夜之间改变,会持续相当长的时间。原因是很复杂的,有的是政治因素,因为某些利益集团需要补偿,但又不能一下子补偿。有的是社会原因。人们的认识也需要一段时间才能调整。因此,制度环境的完善需要一段时间。给定这样的前提,我们就要具体分析在何种情况下,政府以何种方式所有和控制企业有它的“次优”(second best)道理。这里的关键是分析这个次优逻辑,因为在分析出了次优的逻辑和机制之后我们就会知道,随着时间的转移和其它变量的变化,包括制度环境的变化,这一次优的道理也会随之消失,并不会永久留在那里。在转轨经济学中,你不能假定昨天是1978年,明天就变成2020年了。制度不会一下子就变得完善了,变化要有过程。研究这一过程是转轨经济学的一个非常重要的方面,也是和其它经济学领域不一样的方面。第三层含义是说,既然我们知道政府对企业的所有和控制最多是次优,它并不是一种从效率角度上讲最理想的安排,那么,就引出这样一个问题,即什么样的机制容易使政府从企业的所有和控制中撤出,比如使国有企业变成股份企业、民营企业?相反,什么样的机制会容易导致改革走不下去,陷在半路?
本文就是要详细分析这三层道理。中国经济中企业的问题在很大程度上就是政府对企业的所有和控制的问题。在这三层中,主要是后面两层,即在什么情况下,我们可以说明政府参与企业或推迟私有化具有次优的道理?什么样的机制可以诱导政府撤出对企业的控制?在分析这三个问题之前,先简要概述一下已有的企业所有权理论。
二、已有的所有权理论
国外有关于所有权的研究,早期的象科斯(Coase),奥金(Alchian),詹森(Demsetz),威廉姆森(Williamson)等,大家已很熟悉。二十世纪70年代后又往前发展了很多,形成两条主线。一条主线,是研究在完全合同(complete contract)的条件下的信息不对称(asymmetric information)和道德风险(moral hazard)问题。研究集中在如何用合同的不同形式把信息揭示出来和把积极性调动起来。这方面已有相当多的研究,特别是把它应用于企业的“委托一代理”问题。从八十年代后期开始,另一条主线形成,这就是研究不完全合同(incomplete contract)下的激励问题,主要代表有哈特(Hart)和摩尔(Moore)。哈特有本书,中译本马上就要出版,《企业、合同和财务结构》,写得比较通俗易懂,概括了他在这方面的看法。这里的出发点是假定合同是不完全的。任何做实际工作的人都知道合同不可能是完全的,很多情况下都会争吵不休,这是非常现实的。在这种情况下,由于合同不完全,就引出来了所谓剩余控制权(residual control)问题。剩余控制权就是合同没说清的地方谁来做决定的权利。谁有控制权谁就来做决定。如果合同都写清楚了的话,在这个意义下的所有权就没有意义了。因为既然所有的纠纷在事先都写清楚了,谁拿多少,那所有权还有什么意义?这种用剩余控制权来定义所有权与传统的用剩余收入定义所有权就不太一样。按照这一框架,企业所有权概念中最重要的是剩余控制权,而控制权之所以重要,是因为合同不完全。从这里就引出有意思的分析角度。控制权(control rights)实际上是一种权力(power)。这就从通常经济学研究的资源分配问题扩展到研究权力分配问题。这十几年来对这个问题的研究已经应用到非常多的领域,比如公司财务/金融、甚至政治经济学。从合同不完全这个基本的假定出发,即使没有信息不对称的问题,照样存在所有权配置问题。控制权会给控制的人带来很多好处,这些好处可能不反映在工资、期权那种能写出来的收益上。每个国有企业的管理人员都清楚,在国有企业工作的最大收益是那些看不见的收益:对车子的使用,对房子的支配,可以送亲属去国外,可以改动帐目从中给自己带来很多看不见的好处。谁有控制权谁就能较容易地得到这些好处。
所以不完全合同的分析框架确实使对于所有权的分析前进了一大步。但我不觉得这是对完全合同的分析的一种替代,因为这里面分析的问题不完全一样。在完全合同里,因为有关合同不完全时出现的问题被假定掉了,使得它可以集中地探讨信息不对称问题,以及什么样的信息好,什么样的信息不好这样的问题。而在合同不完全的框架下,事后重新讨价还价而造成的成本收益问题便是分析的中心。虽然最初的研究是诸如套牢(lock-in)这样的问题,但是文献发展到现在,已经跳出了这样的问题。比如,一个应用是研究债权和股权的差别。通常人们看到的是收益形式上的差别,即前者是固定的利息收入,后者是剩余收入。但从控制权角度看,两者又有另外的差别。就是说,在企业健康的时候,控制权在股东手里;一旦破产了,控制权就转移到债权人手里。
我的兴趣是研究在转轨经济中的企业所有制和控制权的问题。我觉得,这两条主线都非常有用。在转轨过程中,我们更有理由相信,很多合同更不完全。首先,在发达国家能写得很详细的合同,在我们转轨经济中就不会写得详细,因为人们还没有经验。第二,在发达国家有一个好的执法机构在后面执行合同,因为那里有一套法制体系,政府是第三者。这就不是我们这里的现实情况。事实上,转轨本身就是从原来没有法治的状态,转向有法治的状态。因此,我们在多数情况下就不能假定政府会公正地裁判经济合同。我们通常说,政府不是一个第三者而是一个经济的参与者。至少在我们还未完成转轨过程之前,这是一个非常重要的事实。如果是这样,你对签的合同,能相信它能全部被执行吗?在很大程度上是不能全部被执行的。所以,我们就更有理由相信,很多激励问题在成熟的经济中可以通过完全合同解决,但在转轨过程中则不会,因为基本的制度不一样。这就说明,不完全合同这一分析工具对于我们研究转轨时期的企业是非常有用的,运用这样一些分析工具来重新看一下所有制问题,会得到一些新的启发。
三、政府对企业所有和控制的不利因素
下面谈第一个问题。第一个问题是说,在制度环境完善的条件下,无论从理论还是实证角度,都很难说明政府对企业的直接所有和控制有任何优势。这有四方面的原因:
第一个方面是信息问题。哈耶克的基本想法是,信息是分散在全社会的,任何人都不可能在社会里对所有的信息全部了解,每一个人都有一些别人没有的信息。市场经济最大的好处,相对于计划经济,就是能够利用分散权利决策的过程而充分利用掌握在每个人手中的信息。而计划经济试图把信息集中在某一个部门,然后做出决策,这是非常没有效率的。这是哈耶克1945年的论文,是一个非常深刻的观察。

但是哈耶克只是比较市场与中央计划,并没有比较企业的国有与私有。政府所有企业是否比私人拥有企业具有信息优势?考虑一个对等情况:国家作为一个所有者,聘用一个经理来经营国有企业,而一个私人老板也雇用一个经理。在两种情况下,所有权和经营权或控制权都是分离的,所有者都不可能有完全的信息,但谁有可能有更好一点的呢?我们比较难说明政府有什么优势。因为任何政府可能有的对经理的监测方式,一个私人老板也会有,还可能更多。为什么可能更多呢?这是因为如果企业全部是国有独资,那么信息监督来源只是国家一家。但是如果所有权是分散的,比如说一部分股份公开上市,那末就有很多投资主体在市场上对它进行监督、评价。市场上各种各样的金融机构以及评价公司就是靠搜集、传播这种信息为职业的。它们有激励这样做是因为企业的所有权是可以买卖的。有了产权的变换之后,才可能把信息出让,因为人们真正是在用钱买东西,这个信号是有用的,不然只是对它做一个评价,没人知道你这个评价是对的。如果国家垄断了一个企业的所有权,这种信息来源就少了。
第二方面是政府行为的目标问题。我们不能假定政府永远是政治目标。但是我们可以假定政府的目标不是纯经济的。比如,当银行是政府所有时,政府可以让银行接受退役军人,安置这些人当然是政府的一个目标。而私人的目标不可能是为了接纳退伍军人,他是看这个人是不是真的对我有用。但政府确实有这个职责。军人是为了保卫国家,有社会目标的,对军人的许诺是退伍后安排就业。这也是一个合同,这是无可非难的。并不是说政府不可以干预私有企业,当然可以。但是当政府拥有了企业的所有权和控制权,它就可以比较容易地、低成本地干预企业。由于政府不是纯经济的目标,所以它的很多决策从经济效益角度讲,相对于私人企业来说,具有更多的扭曲。这并不是说政府是非理性的。就它的非经济目标而言,它是理性的。如果我们把经济效率作为主要的标准,政府行为的目标问题常常就直接导致政府拥有企业没有优势。

第三个是政府的可信承诺问题(credible commitment)。政府不同于自然人和其它机构是因为它的权力很大。这个权力大,又是好事又是坏事。权力大了以后,可以做很多事。也正因为如此,事先承诺不做某些事事后就变得不可信。比如中央银行的货币政策,一种观点认为,中央银行应该采用事先固定的“法则”(rule),而不应使用事后“随意性决策”(discretion)。与此相关的是中央银行的行长任期应该特别长,不受政府换届的影响。总而言之是希望通过这些制度安排使得政府承诺的稳定金融政策变得非常可信,不因一时的经济低迷而做出一些对于长久经济稳定不好的决定。从这里我们看到一个基本原理,即要想使承诺变得可信,应该增加交易成本,使政策变化的成本上升。

这是一个很有意思、似乎有背与通常的直觉的原理。在世界银行的一个有关项目评估中的制度作用的研讨会上,主持人在开场白上说:“我们最近从制度经济学学到很多东西。我们要尽量减少信息不对称,尽量减少交易成本。”后来我评论说:“这有一定道理,但不完全对。”当可信承诺是主要问题的时候,我们要增加信息不对称,增加交易成本。这是为了保证当时所许诺的过后不改变。在转轨经济中有两大现象与承诺问题有关,一个是软预算约束问题,一个是随意增税,乱收费问题。事先说“你要亏损,我肯定不补”。事后发现,问题出来了,还是非常理性地去补。事先说好了,“我保证什么税也不加,也不乱收费”。事后看到你的利润多了,又变了政策。这两种情况,对人的激励都是非常不好的。权力越大,控制的资源越多,往往不容易做出可信承诺。比如当政府控制中央银行时,当它看到这么多企业破产,它就想办法把它们救出来,如果没有钱,它就可以印钞票。如果另外一个政府不控制中央银行(比如地方政府),也不控制这么多资产,那么它就无力去解救。所以权力大,在某种程度上是负担,不是资产。

最后,即使前面的那些问题都不存在,也还有一个政府负担过重问题(overload)。我们的政府太累。政府要做的事情很多,应做那些私人部门做不了的事情。我们知道,任何一个公司都有它的“核心强项”(core competence)。政府的核心强项应是诸如宏观稳定、执行合同和法律、提供公共品等等。如果再让它去管企业,必然会到报酬递减的方向去。即使没有其他的问题,庞大的政府的内部管理也是问题。

从以上这四个方面来看(当然还会有其他的很多方面),政府的信息问题、目标函数问题、可信承诺问题和官僚体系问题都使得政府所有和控制企业的成本太大。现在绝大多数经济学家会同意,作为长远的目标,可能除了一些极少数的特殊部门外,政府对企业的所有和控制在经济意义上并无优势。

四、转轨期间政府对企业所有和控制的次优原因

中国的改革经历表明,企业私有化开始的较晚,只是在1994年以后,国有小企业和乡村集体企业的私有化才大规模开始,而大型国有企业还在股份制里面探索。到九十年代中期,纯粹私有企业在工业里不超过20%,对经济增长起主力作用的企业并不是私有企业,而是那些政府所有或控制的国有,特别是集体企业,是那些些产权不太清楚、不太规范的企业。这是一个基本的事实。政府所有或控制的企业不仅包括国有企业和集体企业,也包括合资和股份制公司中国家占大头的企业。

有什么样的理论能说明这种情况呢?我的基本的思路是这样的。我们现在的制度环境离理想状态还相差甚远,在这种情况下,有些非常规的制度安排作为一种过渡形式有一定的次优道理(second best)。在由计划向市场的转轨期间,不仅仅市场制度,而且政府体制,都是不完善的。在相当长的一个时间内,可能十年、二十年内,政府和市场的制度都将在不停地演变。因此,制度失灵,包括市场失灵和政府失灵两方面,就使得非常规形式的企业的政府所有和控制有它的一定的道理。这只是一个基本原理,重要的是要研究其中的具体机制是什么?我下面给出五种机制。

第一,在相当长的时期内,从改革初期到现在,我们没有很好的对产权的保护制度,因此产权是不安全的。产权的不安全性有两种。一种是经济人之间,一方会侵犯另一方的权益。另一种是政府侵犯经济人权益,比如它可以毁坏自己的承诺而乱收费。在转轨期间,政府侵权是一个更严重的问题,因为政府的权力很大却对它没有有效的制约。看一看我国的乡镇集体企业。九十年代初,温州人说得很清楚,我们太“私”了,不够“红”,有风吹草动,总是我们先有麻烦。而乡镇集体企业,虽然激励上没有我们强,但是他们的安全性比我们强。在中国,“太私”和“太红”都不太好,一边太不安全了,另一边激励太差了。我在一篇文章中,试图把这个非常简单的道理作成模型进行仔细分析。如果我们不能假定产权是安全的,也不能假定政府有可信的承诺,那末某级(或某部门)政府可以做到一些个人不能做到的事情,特别是可以提供一种安全的保护。这不是最优安排,而是一种次优的安排。因为在法制建立的比较好的情况,对政府的这种作用没有需求,而政府干预还有成本。在中国的这个特殊阶段,很多看起来不规范的东西,却有一定生命力,在一段时期内可以发挥作用。

第二,由于缺乏规范的税收制度,政府用对企业的直接控制作为替代。我们都知道,计划经济向市场经济转轨,税收体系必须大改造。在计划体制下,国家的所有税收都集中在国有部门,通过把投入价格定得非常低,工业品价格定得很高,将利润全部从工业部门拿来,很简单。而市场经济是分散的、竞争的作业,需要一套新的符合市场规律的税收制度。而这套制度不是一下子就能建立的。当政府对企业有控制权的时候,它收税就比收私有企业要容易。当政府没有控制权时,企业就容易作假帐。当政府有控制权时,企业也可以作假帐,但程度是不一样的,因为政府可以开除经理。我们对中国的乡镇企业做了一个实证研究,发现一个省的乡镇集体企业相对于乡镇私营企业的比例与国家和乡村政府从该省收到的税和费成正相关。这就说明,政府所有制和控制权对政府能拿到多少是正相关的。我们知道,乡镇政府很重要的财政来源是乡镇集体企业。无锡的乡镇集体企业多,乡镇财政比较好;而温州的私有企业多,税收的比例相对比较少。这可以从不完全合同来理解。乡镇政府对集体企业有了控制权之后,它对集体企业的帐目就比对私人企业知道的多,因为控制权导致权力,而权力导致信息。不完全合同理论的一个好处是可以推出来信息多少是内生的,是由产权安排的。政府把产权给到私人手里,政府就失去了可以随时查帐的权力。

第三,国有企业推迟私有化的一个重要原因是缺乏社会保障机制。这与目标函数和控制权有关。如果政府拥有企业,它就可以决定什么时候多雇些人,什么时候少雇些人,因为它是最终的所有者。而政府的目标函数里包括了解雇工人可能造成骚乱的社会成本,这些外部性问题政府要考虑。但私人老板不管这些外部性带来的成本,只要这个工人对我的边际成本大于边际贡献,我就把他赶出去。如果有很好的社会保障机制,这是有效率的。但在没有社会保障的条件下,由于私人的纯粹的追求利润的目标,可能造成社会看来是过多的解雇工人。如果大量解雇工人对社会造成不安定,从而导致对私人经济发展不利的话,那么拖延私有化对经济发展有一定的好处。值得注意的是这一结论只在社会保障机制不健全的条件下才成立。

第四,公司治理结构问题。在发达国家,公司治理需要一整套法律的支持,比如对小股东的保护,因为51%的投票结果可以不考虑另外49%的利益。所以要有一套法律规定,到底小股东有多少权利,到底有多少信息必须披露出来,股东会规定有多少人参加,等等,要有一整套规定,投资者才愿意把钱吐出来。不然的话,就是内部人或大股东控制了。没有一套法律机制,公司的经理便拥有实际的控制权,这样的公司治理结构就带来一系列问题,基本的是两个问题。一个是很难撤换经理,二是很难吸收外面的融资,因为投资者怕被坑。事实上,有法律并不难,难的是执法,尤其是在像我们这样的转轨经济国家。在这种情况下,把大型国有企业私有化后未必会有好的公司治理结构。这是拖延私有化的一个原因。公司治理结构的另一问题是股权过分分散,如果投资者都很小,就存在免费搭车的问题。这是因为一个企业决策对于企业所有股东来说是公共品,任何个人不会有精力也不愿意承担这样的成本监督企业决策。所以公司治理中往往需要较大的投资者。大的投资者无非两种,外资和内资。如果以外资为主,容易产生民族主义情绪,因为这牵涉到国与国之间的利益问题。而国内的大投资者的出现需要一段时间,并不是马上就有的。政府作为一个大投资者,虽然有很多问题,但它可以减少这种分散投资者带来的免费搭车的问题。

第五,特殊行业监管机制问题。比如银行业,它跟一般的制造业不同。即使在发达国家,对金融业都有很强的监管。银行的投资者都是一些小的存款者。他们跟一般的投资者不一样,就是不管在任何情况下,都有权利把钱取出来。这就使得银行业不同与其他行业,需要政府采取一种监管机制。在这种监管机制有效之前,政府要想对银行有所控制,往往采取所有权控制的方式。因为所有权引出任命权。国家拥有“工”、“农”、“中”、“建”,因此政府可以任命、解雇它们的行长。虽然这是一种非常粗糙的办法,但确实是一种有效的控制机制。还有一些特殊行业,比如国防工业。在美国,国防订货都是承包给私人企业的,因为它有一套程序和对信息控制的办法,所以既可以发挥私有企业在制造国防产品上的积极性和市场的竞争力,同时又确保国家机密不泄露出去。这在中国是很难想象的。国防工业还能私有化?之所以不可能是因为一旦私有化了,信息的流通就没有办法控制了。在这种情况下,当然不能私有化。

以上五个方面都是说明了在转轨期间的特殊制度环境使得政府对企业的所有和控制有次优的道理。每一个方面都可以写出一个模型,把推理变得比较严格,从而使我们清楚看到在什么情况下这些机制可以有功效,而这些则是我们以前没有想到的。同时我们也可以发现它们的局限性。因为这些机制的运作都是有条件的,一旦这些假定不成立了,情况就会改变。

五、政府撤出对企业的所有和控制的机制

制度变迁是一个动态过程。我们现在看到的是一张静态照片,在目前这样的一个环境下,政府对企业的控制有它的一定道理。这是我们理解世界的很重要的一步,但是不完全。进入90年代,特别是1994年以后,我国的改革逐步开始向比较规范的市场经济体制转轨,私有化进程加快,特别是中小企业。这就提出一个问题,即什么样的机制可以促使政府脱离对企业的控制和所有?我们可以把中国的改革看作两个阶段,第一个阶段中很多非常规的过渡性制度安排发挥了很大的、意想不到的作用。在此基础上,第二阶段中这些非常规的过渡性制度又转轨到比较规范的、常规的、效率更高的制度安排。后面这个问题是目前非常重要的问题。

我在这里从两个方面分析。第一个方面是整体经济组织结构的灵活性问题。关于组织结构的灵活性,文献上有一些研究,主要是在企业层次,也有一些是在经济体层次。所谓结构灵活性,是说改革起来比较容易。首先我们用层级制(hierarchies)和多元制(polyarchies)作比较。在层级制下,做成一件事须很多人批准,任何一层都有否决权。而在多元制下,其中任何一个部门批准就能够做成一件事。任何一元都有批准权。这是两种很不同的组织结构。比方说,你要出国。在一种体制下,你要出国要盖两个章,一个是公安局,一个是社科院,任何一个部门都可以否决。在另一种制度下,你只要一个章,或者是北京市的章,或者是上海市的章,任何一个部门都有批准权。这两种制度的结果就不一样了,后者具有更大的灵活性,因为这边申请不到还可以跑到那边去申请。经济改革的原理是一样的。企业改制问题,即使在这个县搞不动,在另一个县就可能搞得动,如果每一个县有批准权的话。所以,组织结构不一样导致出经济中的灵活性不一样。

与此相关的是组织结构上的U型(unitary form)和M型(multi-divisional form)的区别。前者按“条条”原理组织,后者按“块块”原理组织。按条条原理组织时,协调能力较好,但要作出改变就很难,因为有一环不改,全都不能改。而按块块原理组织时,每一块自成体系,比如特区。虽然块块之间的协调很难,但它有一种灵活性,因为每一块可以自己行动而不影响其他块。中国的改革在很大程度上受益于这种结构。中国的很多改革,都是从一个地区先搞起来。而俄国就不同,因为它在经济的整体上是U型的组织结构,按条条来控制的。先搞一个条条是没有用的,必须所有条条都要动,所以非常困难。

国家体制上有联邦制(federalism)与一统制(unitary state)的差别,在财政体制上则有财政联邦制与财政统收统支制的区别。财政联邦制下地区财政是相对独立的,在这种情况下,地区性试验、地区性制度的创新,有财政上的可能性和动力,不需要什么事都经过中央。日本政府的经济组织方式相当中央集权,特别是大藏省的权力极大。在这种情况下,明明都知道问题出在哪儿,就是很难改变,因为“牵一发动全身”。这种组织结构在制度变迁的时候就较少灵活性。

第二个方面是政府的激励机制问题。近年来我国各级政府激励的改变可以从两条来看。第一条是地方政府预算约束变硬,这在1994年以后较为明显。这有多种原因,比如紧的货币政策,银行系统的收权,《预算法》的实施,新的税收制度等等。非常有意思的是,过去我们总是指责银行乱贷款,现在却指责银行“息贷”。过去是国有企业从来不开除工人,现在是担心下岗人数太多。预算约束变硬对政府激励的改变很重要。如果政府可以期望对银行施加压力或从财政渠道拿到钱的话,它就没有把企业卖掉或对它改制的动力。

第二条是市场竞争的增加。现在听到的很多的是“恶性竞争”、“不公平竞争”这类词。但这本身说明竞争在增加。竞争使得租金下降。特别是当企业大面积亏损时,它们已经不是政府生财的地方了,相反,它们已经变成了包袱。如果一旦变成了包袱,那么政府的激励是什么呢?很简单,就是把它们甩掉。包袱越重的,甩掉的动力就越大。而对一些特别肥的,比如电信,就没有人愿意放手。

因此,从一种次优状态转向最优状态,比如政府从对企业的所有和控制中撤出,并不是不可能的,它取决于政府的激励和组织结构的灵活性。这是研究内生性制度变迁问题中非常有意思的课题,还有很多研究工作值得去做。

六、总结:作为一种过渡制度的企业的政府所有和控制

中国的转轨经历非常有意思,素材非常丰富。作为一种实证研究,关于企业所有制和控制权问题上有一些重要现象需要解释。在中国,为什么在相当长的一段时间里,非私有的、政府介入的企业会有这样大的正面作用?而私有企业的作用比我们想象的要小?私有化的进程为何比较慢?为何企业改制上小企业进行得快,而大企业很慢?我们需要用一种比较系统的理论解释这些现象,既符合经济学的基本原理,又与观察到的现实相对应。研究要得到认可,就必需在已有的经济学框架里面进行。这样主流经济学才会明白转轨经济的模型与通常的标准模型之间到底有哪些不一样。这里重要的区别是制度环境不同。因此,企业的政府所有和控制就有不同的机制和含义。但是,我们不能用静态的观点来看。从动态的角度观察,这种机制最好是被看作是一种过渡性的制度安排

more

Wednesday, August 24, 2005

兩岸地下通匯 金額龐大

2005.08.24  工商時報
李道成/上海報導
兩岸金融業還在為新台幣與人民幣直接兌換坐困愁城時,地下金融業者早就憑著綿密的客戶網絡,還有龐大的貨幣存量,讓人民幣、新台幣往來兩岸間,就像搭直通車般暢行無阻。
今年初,上海市破獲了一起以台灣人為主謀的龐大地下金融案件,一口氣逮捕近二十名經濟罪犯,其中主要是台灣人。
這起地下金融刑事案件,不僅震撼了上海公安部門,更驚訝的是當地的金融業者,因為其中牽涉的金額高達數十億元人民幣,甚至還有好幾家上海知名台資企業就是他們的大客戶。
除了訝異不已外,當地的金融業也嗅到了來自台商間的龐大通匯商機。一位每日經手數億元人民幣的外匯掮客就透露,以目前長江三角洲與珠江三角洲一帶數萬家台資企業來說,不需要經由地下金融調度資金者算是少數。
雖然近年來,兩岸政府都不約而同宣示,要持續打擊兩岸間的地下金融管道,不過隨著雙方經貿依存度的不斷的擴大,地下通匯的金額有增無減。

more

A little drama added to overseas Chinese community

Undercovered FBI have worked for a Chinese gang distributing counterfeit cigarettes to streets for years, Haa ha, right, FBI let counterfeit cigarettes to be sold to the public! I guess the cigarette quality must have been good, perhaps even better than the authentic ones!
Otherwise, look out, Marlboro and Newport suckers, please check if they're "made in China" before you smoke!

Taylor said the agents not only arranged with customs officials to let the illegal cigarettes in at Port Newark, they also had the federal Centers for Disease Control test them to make sure they were no more toxic than regular cigarettes and set up a warehouse in southern New Jersey to distribute them.

The story you really don't wanna miss!!
Another good one Just like what we've seen in movies, cool!
Chinese version
I guess certain HongKong action movie writer has started making money on this one already...

UPDATE: just came across this interesting post by simon, saying that he found many more businesses in Big Apple. Apparently simon don't know FBI is operating them:)

Feds: Elderly Maryland couple was at center of illegal importing

By GEOFF MULVIHILL
Associated Press Writer

August 23, 2005, 5:42 PM EDT


CAMDEN, N.J. -- Back in November 1999, an older couple from a suburb of the nation's capital asked some undercover FBI agents for help.

The couple, both in their 60's, explained to the agents _ who were posing as members of the Mafia _ that they had been smuggling Chinese-made cigarettes into California but were being foiled and were looking for a new way to get their goods into the U.S.
That connection, recounted this week by authorities and in court papers, sparked a six-year relationship that allegedly gained the agents a foothold in a huge counterfeiting operation that involved a billion cigarettes, more than $3 million in counterfeit cash, fake Viagra, real club drugs and the promise of weapons, including anti-tank missile launchers.

It all ended Sunday, when two agents lured eight suspects to New Jersey for a fake wedding.

In sweeps since the weekend across the United States and in Canada, 60 people have been arrested, including eight nabbed as they converged on a staged wedding between two undercover FBI agents who were working the case.

Michael Drewniak, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office in New Jersey, said Tuesday that all of the main suspects were in custody; some of the 27 others indicted in the case are believed to be in other countries.

It all started, according to federal agents, when Chang Shan Liu and his wife, May Liu, both of Gaithersburg, Md., told two undercover FBI agents they needed help smuggling cigarettes.

Stephen J. Taylor, the chief of the terrorism unit for the U.S. Attorney's office in Newark, said an FBI informant told the agency in 1999 that Chang Shan "Charles" Liu, 67, and May Liu, whose age has been listed in documents as being anywhere from 65 to 76, had been smuggling Chinese cigarettes into California, but were being foiled and were looking for a new way into the country.

The cigarettes, Taylor said, were made in plants on mainland China to look like U.S. brands, mainly Marlboro and Newport.

Suppliers in China bribed customs officials there to get the tobacco onto U.S.-bound container ships, authorities said. By offloading in the U.S. and skirting hefty taxes, the Lius and a network of other alleged criminals stood to make huge profits, authorities said.

But without a place to unload them, there was no money to be made.

Enter the undercover agents, who allegedly met the couple in Atlantic City. "They told the bad guys they had a hook who could get them through customs," Taylor said.

Taylor said the agents not only arranged with customs officials to let the illegal cigarettes in at Port Newark, they also had the federal Centers for Disease Control test them to make sure they were no more toxic than regular cigarettes and set up a warehouse in southern New Jersey to distribute them.

The Lius, according to court papers, paid $50,000 to $70,000 to the agents to get each of 14 shipping containers delivered into the United States.

Each container had around 500,000 packs of cigarettes, many of which authorities said were eventually sold to smokers, many of them in California, New York and New Jersey.

At a retail price of per $20 carton _ less than half the retail value for legal cigarettes _ a shipping container could generate up to $1.1 million.

And the sellers would skirt not only the tobacco and sales tax, but also an import duty of around $100,000 per container by bringing the goods into the U.S. marked as toys or furniture.

The fake mobsters found themselves doing deals with drivers and distributors all over the country. Sometimes, the agents would deliver the cigarettes to self-storage facilities or straight to dealers' trucks; sometimes drivers came to them.

In some cases, Taylor said, those lower-level criminals would offer to pay for the cigarettes not only cash but also in the club drug ecstasy. The involvement of street drugs broadened what was already a wide federal probe.

It was other connections overseas made through the Lius and their alleged associates that led to deals for arms, crystal meth and more than $3 million in high-quality counterfeit $100 bills, Taylor said.

The operation was busted dramatically over the weekend, thanks to a staged wedding to be held Sunday on a yacht off Cape May. Chang S. Liu was on the guest list.

Instead of taking guests to the wedding though, limousines took them to the FBI offices in Northfield, where they were arrested.

Chang S. Liu appeared in court Monday and on Tuesday was released on a $400,000 secured bond. His wife has not appeared in court; she is recovering from a stroke. Neither could be reached for comment; a home phone listed under their name has been disconnected.


Yet another one


'Wedding' wiles worldly group of suspects

By TROY GRAHAM

Philadelphia Inquirer


The FBI capped off a six-year international smuggling investigation by faking a wedding last weekend for two undercover agents and inviting suspects from all over the world to attend.

Ten of the "guests" were given limousine rides Sunday from their Atlantic City hotels purportedly to a wedding aboard a yacht off Cape May. The limos took a detour behind the FBI building in Northfield, N.J., where agents surrounded the cars and arrested the suspects.

"It was brilliant," said Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen J. Taylor, who is chief of the terrorism unit for New Jersey. "I wish I could say I came up with the idea. It was a female undercover FBI agent who came up with it."

The arrests were part of a huge roundup that netted 59 of the 87 people indicted in federal courts in New Jersey and California on charges of smuggling cigarettes, drugs, guns and counterfeit U.S. currency. Fifty-seven people were charged in six indictments in New Jersey. That case will be prosecuted in federal court in Camden. Eleven of those 57 people - including four of the wedding guests, still wearing formal attire - appeared for bond hearings in Camden yesterday.

Most were of Chinese or Taiwanese decent, but there also was a dual Italian Canadian citizen and a Philadelphia man born in Israel. About half of the defendants are suspected of being in the country illegally, Taylor said.

U.S. Magistrate Joel B. Rosen said he would wait until all the defendants were assembled in Camden to hold an arraignment - probably not until mid-September.

The investigation began in November 1999, when FBI agents from the Atlantic City office went undercover and posed as members of the Mafia to meet with Chang Shan Liu and his wife, May, both of Gaithersburg, Md.

The Lius served as brokers for two Chinese citizens named as the ringleaders in the cigarette-smuggling operation, Taylor said. The ring had been importing cigarettes through Long Beach, Calif., but was looking for a new port of entry after several seizures there.

The undercover agents told the Lius they had contacts at Port Newark who could get shipments through customs. From December 2001 until last week, 21 shipments - containing 200 million counterfeit cigarettes - came through Newark with the help of the undercover agents.

Cigarettes made in China

The cigarettes were manufactured in several factories in mainland China to look like Newport and Marlboro brands. Customs officials in China were bribed to allow the shipments to leave, Taylor said.

Because the cigarettes were not taxed, they were sold throughout the country at prices as low as about half the price of legal cigarettes. The undercover agents handled delivery of the cigarettes to places and people specified by the Lius.

Most of the cigarettes were distributed in New York, New Jersey and Philadelphia, but some went as far as Chicago and even Canada. The FBI had the cigarettes tested to make sure they were no more toxic than other cigarettes before allowing them to be distributed.

Chang Shan Liu also was charged with importing counterfeit Viagra through Newark.

The investigation eventually branched into several other areas. A distributor in Chicago, for instance, asked to pay the undercover agents for the cigarettes in ecstasy pills instead of cash. He later introduced the agents to a Canadian man who sold the agents more than 12,000 ecstasy pills.

The undercover agents also began handling cigarette shipments for another man, Khanh "Keith" Tang, Taylor said. The agents asked Tang whether he had any connections for drugs, guns and counterfeit money.

Counterfeit currency

Tang took the agents to meet Jyimin "Jimmy" Horng in Phuket, Thailand. Horng eventually arranged to ship to Newark a total of $3.3 million in counterfeit currency - known as "super notes" because of the high quality of the bills. Super notes often are manufactured in North Korea.

Horng also sent 390 grams of crystal meth into the country and arranged a shipment of weapons. The agents selected the arms from a catalog they were provided. The $1 million shipment, which included rockets, silenced submachine guns and antitank missiles, would have arrived last month. The smugglers put off the arrival for a couple months because of the heightened security after the London terrorist bombings, Taylor said.

During the trip to Thailand the undercover agents brought along their "girlfriends," who were agents providing extra backup.

The "wedding" for one of the couples was announced about seven months ago.

"Invitations were sent out, a date was given and RSVPs were received from different points around the world," said U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Christie.

The wedding was set for the fictitious yacht Royal Charm, which was actually the FBI's operational name for the investigation.


2005.08.24  中國時報
坐上迎賓車 直達聯調局 FBI鴻門婚宴 一舉擒華人黑幫
閻紀宇/綜合廿三日外電報導


美國司法部長岡薩雷斯昨天宣布,執法當局透過長達四年半的臥底行動,破獲一個龐大的國際走私、偽造與洗錢集團,八十七名嫌犯遭到起訴,其中五十九人已經在美國與加拿大的十一個城市遭到逮捕,另外廿八人在逃。據熟悉案情的官員透露,這個集團的主要成員是來自澳門、中國大陸與香港等地的華裔罪犯,以一個許(徐)姓家族為核心。

這個集團走私與偽造的違禁品與商品種類極廣,當局迄今已查獲四百四十萬美元的偽造百元美鈔、市值四千兩百萬元的假菸、四萬五千一百顆快樂丸、五.五公斤甲基安非他命、價值七十萬美元的偽造美國郵票、市值一萬美元的假陽痿藥「威而鋼」,以及數十萬美元的各種走私物品;此外該集團還準備走私一批價值一百萬美元的武器,包括火箭彈發射器、自動步槍、消音手槍、消音衝鋒槍。司法部助理檢察長李希特說:「這個集團幾乎可以讓人『一次購足』各種非法物品。


臥底幹員假結婚 42人上鉤

立下大功的兩項臥底行動,分別是在東岸新澤西州進行的「皇家魔力行動」(OperationRoyal Charm)與西岸加州洛杉磯地區的「噴煙龍行動」(Operation Smoking Dragon),以聯邦調查局(FBI)幹員為主力,九個聯邦官署、加拿大皇家騎警與多個地方執法單位參與任務,司法部表示,偵辦規模之大史無前例。

逮捕行動中最精彩的一段過程,猶如電影「婚禮終結者」的改編版,廿一日下午在新澤西州的大西洋城展開。一男一女兩名長期臥底、深獲集團信賴的聯調局幹員,假意表示他們要在當地「五月角」外海的一艘遊艇「皇家魔力號」上舉行婚禮,廣發喜帖邀請集團重要成員觀禮,結果有四十二人上鉤,其中有不少是從中國大陸遠道而來。

這批黑幫賓客抵達大西洋城之後,坐上由「新人」特地準備的豪華「迎賓」禮車,結果禮車並沒有駛向碼頭,而是直達聯調局位於諾斯菲爾德的拘留所。他們被請下車、戴上手銬時一臉錯愕,其中一人帶著一對勞力士金錶準備送給「新人」;另一人得知「婚禮已經取消」時,還很關切地探問「新人」到底出了什麼事。

美金香菸威而鋼 啥都偽造

兩位聯調局幹員從四年半前開始偽裝成黑手黨分子,在新澤西州與該集團的一對劉姓夫妻接頭,表示自己有銷售走私貨的管道,想與該集團合作。當時該集團從南加州走私上岸的假菸屢被當局抄獲,正想另闢管道,於是雙方一拍即合,從二○○一年十二月開始,改經新澤西州的紐渥克港走私假菸。這些劣質假菸是在中國大陸製造,冠上「Marlboro」(萬寶路)與「Newport」兩種品牌,經由賄賂中國海關官員放行,以家具等商品名義裝入貨櫃運往美國,再分銷至美加各地。執法單位為取信於集團,在化驗確定其毒性並不高於一般香菸後,真的將這些假菸在街頭販賣,價格為真菸一半。

雙方的「合作」默契日益順暢,於是進一步從去年四月開始,透過集團的唐姓與洪姓嫌犯,以同樣手法走私北韓製造的偽鈔,這批號稱「超級鈔票」的一百美元偽鈔在國際上赫赫有名,連最精密先進的儀器都未必能判定真偽,不過執法單位當然沒有讓它在市面上流通。後來唐姓與洪姓兩名嫌犯還準備走私大批火力強大的槍械,但是只來得及匯出訂金,整個集團就已宣告瓦解。

more

Tuesday, August 23, 2005

Buyo has a scary news!

The US Republican leading televangelist Pat Robertson has called for the assassination of the Venezuelan president. I actually watch his TV news presentation on CBN sometimes and thought he was a quite mild person. I didn't know he is such a dangerous character. Details and links are here

more

Divorce certificate issued by the Group of Revolution in Beijing

This certificate was issued in 1970 and reads:
Both parties were born in 1910. They got married in 1952 and the reason of divorce is that they don't get along with each other. The husband will pay 20 RMB to the wife for raising their daughter and the major household valuables including a radio and several suite cases will all go to the wife.
Note, 1970 is right in the middle of the Culture Revolution. Many couples were forced to divorce because one of them was often accused for anti-revolution. I guess it's unusual for a Chinese couple to divorce at their 60's at that time. Furthermore almost everything went to the wife and their daughter. It's highly probable that the husband was anti-revolutionary!

All these including the old photos below stolen from cat898 and sina forum

more

Yellow photos

Chinese flight attendants (one year after the end of the Culture Revolution) in SEXY BLUE!!!



The earthy Chairman Mao just couldn't resist a modern sexy gal who smells just like Shanghai in 1930's!


Chairman Mao Zhedong and his third wife Jiang Qing (the head of Gang of Four) at Yang'an in 1930's

My god, Jiang Qing at that time looks like Chu Mei-feng (璩美鳳) Perhaps Chairman Mao made their film at Yan'an as well, who knows:P

Saddam Hussein and his wife in 1963... did not like Islamic people at all...They were American spies, definitely!



The wildest and most beautiful couple in KMT's republic of China: Xu Zhimo and Lu xiaoman!Two young Princesses in the scence: the daughter of Chairman Mao: Li Na (left 1) and the daughter of vice Chairman Lin: Lin Doudou (right 2). The rightest one is the evil: Ye Qun!


more

Monday, August 22, 2005

倪乐雄:中美冲突的本源因素及不确定性

● 倪乐雄


在中美“撞机事件”发生后,人们国际局势谈论得较多的话题是:“中美之间会爆发战争吗?”“中美战争何时爆发?”“中美之间将爆发何种规模的战争?”这些问题都难以回答,不过有一点确是明白无疑,中美之间存在着深深的敌意。本文将着重分析这一敌意的根源、结构、背景、性质、现状以及可能的发展趋势。
从表面上看,也就是大多数国际问题专家认为的那样,台湾问题似乎是中美产生敌意的主要根源,但从深远的历史角度和历史经验来看,台湾问题只是中美冲突表面的聚焦点之一。中美之间的敌意根源于两个因素,一是意识形态的对立;二是正在崛起的强国与现存强国的对立。这两种对立都属水火不相容的性质、并且具有相互诱导的特点。前者发展至极端,可导致西方历史上的十字军东征、伊斯兰的一手执古兰经一手执剑、大革命后的法国同七次反法联盟的对抗、1共产主义世界与资本主义世界的对抗;关于后者,局限于短时段的考察是难以作出正确判断的,需在长时段里寻找规律或加以研判,即应从以往的历史中考察这种类型的冲突的一般规律和模式,可能会给我们以相当的启示。比如古希腊提洛同盟与伯罗奔尼撒同盟的对峙、迦太基与罗马的冲突、奥斯曼土耳其同威尼斯的交锋、2西班牙与英国的抗衡、3普鲁士同法兰西的对抗、4英国同德国及美国与日本的对抗等等。以往历史表明,国与国之间的关系只要符合上述一种,敌意和冲突就很难化解。不幸的是,这两种势同水火、互相诱导的对立都被中美关系所包括。5
中美之间的敌意能否化解?中美两国能否摆脱历史的宿命而避免未来的冲突?考察曾经有过的中美“蜜月”现象,或许有助于认清这一问题。中美之间有过两次“蜜月”,抗日战争和前苏联扩张时期,通过对两次“蜜月”的分析,不难总结出中美交往的一般规律,当中美面临共同敌人威胁,且单凭各自的力量又不足以与之抗衡时,中美两国才会放弃敌意,变得友好甚至结盟。另一个典型例子是一战前的英法关系,法国和英国战前曾非常对立,差点动武,由于德国咄咄逼人的势头成为英法共同的威胁,两国在共同敌人的压力下,一揽子解决了他们之间的分歧,终于化敌为友。若要恢复中美“蜜月”,除非目前出现某个国家或某种新的因素,替代前苏联的角色,对中美再次形成共同威胁。所以,最需要做得是寻找共同的敌人和共同的威胁。然而,举目四望,目前国际社会中,哪些国家和哪些因素能够共同威胁中美两国呢?贸易、印度的核武器发展计划、国际恐怖主义、伊斯兰极端主义等等,都远远不足于取代前苏联而构成两国共同的、严重的威胁。也许有人问?大路朝天,各走半边。中美即不结盟也不对立,相安无事可以吗?很难!在本质上被“丛林原则”所支配的国际社会中,由于中美之间敌意的两个主要根源目前无消除之迹象,因此中美关系友好和敌意很像冬季里冷暖空气的锋面,总是贴在一起,中间没有过渡地带。除非出现一个共同的敌人或共同的威胁,足以抵消中美之间两种致命的对立,遗憾的是,目前这一共同的敌人或共同的威胁并不存在,今后是否出现也不得而知。
从对抗到友好还有一个重要的标志,就是一揽子解决国与国之间存在的重大分歧。6中美之间敌意的化解和冲突的避免需要一揽子解决他们之间存在的问题,目前则缺乏一揽子解决问题的原动力。而这些问题上产生的不信任、磨擦、对抗则反过来不断地加深敌意,在理性层面相互把对方看成是真正的敌人。
那么,经济互补、渗透能否消除敌意、避免冲突呢?有人认为只要加强贸易来往,造成中美经济结构你中有我、我中有你相互依赖的局面,两国和平共处就有了保证。中美两国决策层里亦有不少人持这种观点,然而,这种想法并非绝对可靠,得视具体情况而论。第一次世界大战前英国和德国的经济往来也很密切,按照俄国学者乌特金的说法“当时相互依赖确实达到了令人难忘的规模”,据此欧洲到处弥漫着乐观主义情绪,有人甚至断言“人类已经重返伊甸园”,还有什么理由要打仗?然而,随后发生的两次世界大战将“贸易消除战争”的看法击得粉碎。C?沃尔茨、M?艾尔曼、M?布朗等专家认为“如果国际社会的成员彼此感到恐惧,相互依赖只会增加冲突的可能性。”7第一次世界大战以前,一位英国人曾经考虑到英德之间非常频繁的商品交换,但一看到德国工厂冒烟的烟囱时却说:“这些烟囱每一个都是指向英国的炮口。”两次世界大战表明:相互依赖的经济关系似乎并不能消除深深的敌意,从而避免战争。
但是,也有相反的例子。阿尔萨斯-洛林地区的归属问题,曾是德国和法国不共戴天和卷入两次世界大战的主要原因。战后欧洲经济共同体导致了政治上的合作,乃至发展到今天欧盟的出现,经过半个多世纪经济协作、和源于经济协作的政治合作,德、法恐怕再也不会为阿尔萨斯--洛林地区的归属打仗了。
通过对上述两种相反情形的考察,可以发现经济互补与战争冲突存在着两种模式,一是经济互补不能消除战争,二是经济互补能够消除战争。深究下去,其中的关键取决于相互依赖的程度。如果建立一个理论模型的话,其中必有一个决定性的临界点,经济相互依赖程度达不到这一临界点,则不足以消除敌意和避免战争,反而将这种相互依赖关系变成相互报复的资源,徒增一个新的引爆点,从而加剧了冲突的激烈程度;8经济相互依赖的程度达到并越过这一临界点,则可消除敌意阻止战争。假如笔者这一从历史经验里提炼出来的“经济互补——战争冲突”的理论模式能够成立,那么,现在的问题是:中美经济相互依赖的程度是否已经达到了这一临界点?现实的情况是远没有到达这一临界点,因而“贸易消除敌意和冲突”的模式至少不适用于现在乃至未来相当长一段时期的中美关系。9

“经济互补——战争冲突”理论模型

现在一般都认为台湾问题是中美关系最主要、最关键的问题,但若进一步问:“美国为何采取现行的对台政策?”其答必曰:“出于美国要长期遏制中国的战略考虑。”若再连续追问:“为什么美国选择这种战略?”“这种战略决策背后深藏的动机、心理、思维方式又是怎样一种状态?”这就涉及到较为深层的实质性问题。
我以为在一个相当长的时间内,困扰中美两国最大的实质性问题是:双方都不知道对方将来要干什么。这是一个让双方都不知所措的问题。因为国际关系包括两重性质的互动,一是双方或几方的互动,二是现在与将来的互动。美国不知对方将要干什么,也就不知道自己现在应该干什么。中国不知道美国将来如何对待自己,因而对今天的举措是否正确心里也没有底,例如,对台湾动武与否,早打还是晚打都举棋不定。其中关键问题是未来中国走向不明,相反,美国的意图很明显,要保持一家独霸地位。笔者于去年同美国的军事外交专家进行广泛的交流,在同国务院、国防部、国防大学、陆军战争学院、西点、哈佛、普林斯顿、麻省、太总部的坦率交流中,美方专家共同的特征是对中国未来走向不明,尤其在太平洋战区总部,几位中国问题专家连续追问:“中国将来到底要干什么?”10为弄清未来崛起的中国是否会挑战美国的霸权,美国国内开始重视中国传统的战略文化研究,想从中国古代传统里获得有价值的信息,但至今没有结论。现在的困难在于:中国将来如何对待美国要根据美国将来如何对待中国来确定,而美国将来如何对待中国又需根据中国将来如何对待美国来确定,由于中国未来强大后走向不明(也不可能明了),所以,中美关系今后的短期互动虽呈现表面的逻辑性,但长远互动在本质上处于盲目状态。
中国未来走向不明,不仅导致两国关系长远互动陷于盲目性,也必然给美国带来两种困惑甚至恐惧,一种是未来中国可能威胁自己,由于现在没有加以遏制,最后被动地卷入的冲突;11另一种是本来中国不会同自己发生冲突,但因错误判断中国而采取强硬措施,最终“弄假成真”,导致了将来与中国的冲突。由于中国未来走向事实上不可能有答案,美国将在较长的时间里无法摆脱这两种恐惧。以克林顿为代表的自由主义战略思维和以小布什为代表的现实主义战略思维共存于美国,交替影响美国对华政策,其根本原因是美国无法准确判断中国未来走向、中美关系互动的盲目性以及由此产生的两种恐惧所致。可以预见,美国对华政策将长期徘徊于鸽派和鹰派之间而不得要领。
现实情形就是如此,一个国家无论政治、军事、外交需要预设将来的目标,以便于引导当前的行动,更加东欧发生巨变,美国一时陷于没有对手困境,对于正在迅猛崛起、向现代化作强行军的中国未来走向,美国需要答案,否则目前就无法行动。12但是,这个问题今天不可能有答案。任何国家都无法预料自己将来的命运,因为国家受到国际社会互动的制约。另外,任何国家先前预设的目标、或对世界的承诺等等,都属一代人的主观愿望而已,不能代替第三、四代人想法。没有答案美国无法行动,怎么办?根据人类一般行为规律,在充满敌意的国际社会中,美国现时遵循两种基本的思维途径采取行动,一,以自身文明传统的行为方式为基础,来理解中国追求富强的企图和目的;二,以“绝对保险”的思路筹划未来,并规定今天的任务和采取行动。
细而言之,美国和西方世界从骨子里不相信“中国将来强大了也决不称霸”的承诺。这跟他们的几千年文明传统有极大关系,从古希腊以来,富裕生活和商业贸易、海外殖民、军事扩张、争夺制海权(今天已发展用制空权来完成对制海权的争夺)、强权称霸在欧洲文明史的发展过程中是密不可分的,强大与称霸可以说是同义语。由这种文明传统培育出来的人们,觉得强大而不称霸是不可思议的。东方农耕文明由于其特有的生存方式,财富源于土地耕耘而非开拓海外市场,生存与发展不必与海上贸易、制海权、军事扩张挂钩,使得强大和称霸并不构成必然的关系。中国古代历史基本上可以证明这点。简而言之,西方文明的逻辑是“强大必然称霸”,中华文明的逻辑是“强大未必称霸”。但由西方传统孵化出来的美国在理解东方文明这一特点上存在着难以逾越的障碍,这是中美两国打交道时深层的、潜意识层次里的冲突,也可看作“文明的冲突”。既然强大必然意味着称霸,那就必须遏制,所以美国对中国的基本判断及采取遏制政策的根源,归根结底来自欧洲文明传统和欧洲的历史经验。13
既然作出这样的判断,必要的保险措施就得跟进,美国必须在时间上和空间上立于不败之地,必须在时间上和空间上最大限度地阻止中国的强大。三个例子可以说明问题:
在台湾问题上,美国将会最大限度地利用台湾问题作为遏制中国崛起的砝码,这点今后任何一届美国政府,不管对华强硬派还是缓和派都不会含糊。小布什政府公开声言将不惜任何代价协防台湾,克林顿政府也一样,只不过用另一种语言表达了同一个意思,即在1996年当解放军举行演习时派遣两支航母编队前往台湾海峡。另一方面,美国不支持“台独”而坚持“一个中国”的原则,同时反对武力解决台湾问题,这暴露出美国的另一种心态:即想最大限度地把台湾作为遏制中国崛起的长远战略筹码,又不愿为此付过多的代价。而美国至今的困惑是:不清楚台湾作为战略筹码在遏制中国时份量到底有多大,因此也弄不清楚自己所付代价的限度在哪儿。14
在中国加入WTO问题上,美国支持中国加入WTO组织也是出于“绝对保险”的思路。美国相信:经济生活、经济结构的变化最终要导致政治体制和意识形态的变化,15将中国未来发展纳入美国理想的预设轨道不是不可能的事。另外,一个传统农业社会直接向工业社会或后工业社会的转型将面临巨大困难,加入WTO的中国社会因原本存在的各种社会矛盾,可能会产生剧烈“阵痛”,一旦转型失败,中国将陷于畸形发展的泥潭而成为一个长期“废人”。这样的先例在第三世界国家中比比皆是。所以,中国加入WTO在美国看来有利而无害,转型成功则纳入美国预想之发展轨道,不成功则在“阵痛”中陷于内乱成为残废,不再是美国的对手。这既符合美国根本利益,又其中暗藏杀机,所谓“一石二鸟”也。所以克林顿政府和小布什政府都“支持”中国入世。
另一个保险措施是建立国家导弹防御体系。建立导弹防御体系对美国国家战略来说既是全球性的,也是地区性的,包括三个层面上的利益:第一,美国将在相当程度上摆脱“确保相互摧毁”状况下,同对手互为核人质的地位,而处于对手单方面成为自己的核人质的有利、有力地位。并有可能使全世界有核、无核国家都单方面成为自己的核人质的绝对霸权地位。第二、可彻底摆脱了所谓“无赖国家”利用核武器“四两拨千斤”的威胁。第三,导弹防御体系是遏制中国的一张大牌,如果中国参加军备竞赛,可能像前苏联一样被拖垮。如果不进行军备竞赛,则中国只能接受单方面成为美国核人质的不利地位。因此,建立导弹防御体系对美国国家利益而言,正所谓“一石三鸟”,有百利而无一害,美国迟早是要搞的。16
在充满敌意的环境里,在对方敌友模糊的情况下,宁可把对手当作敌人,也不可认作朋友,这固然保险安全,小布什政府遵循“绝对保险”的思路为美国对华关系策划着将来,且比克林顿政府更趋极端,但是,如前所述,中国未来走向对美国来说是没有真实答案的,“绝对保险”措施是建立在“虚拟”的答案或前提上的,即“中国将来肯定会威胁美国”仅仅是一种虚拟假设,将一个国家根本战略和社会资源动员建立在虚拟性质的基础上,其不明智、弄险的性质是不言而喻的。可以肯定,任何一届美国政府、包括小布什政府,如果把对华政策建立在这一“虚拟”前提上,内心都是不踏实的、都会激起国内另一派战略思维的强烈反对,因而也可预料任何对华过分强硬的政策是不会长久的。因为还存在着另一种可能,如果中国未来根本不会对美国产生威胁,倒是“虚拟假设”为基础的对华政策造就了未来中美冲突,岂不自讨苦吃?所以,美国任何一届政府即使采取对华强硬政策,也不得不考虑分寸的把握。17
但上述分析都属于现时状况的分析,不能代替历史分析,而且现实最终服从于未来,从历史纵向看,对于想永远保持一强凌天下的美国来说,任何一个正在崛起的国家都将自动地成为它的未来假想敌。展望前景,中美双方的感觉都极差。回到前面的问题,根据历史经验,既然中美敌意的根源由两种水火不相容矛盾构成,一时又无法化解,那么中美关系就可能出现两种前景,一是敌意将完全按自身的逻辑毫无抑制地展开,台湾问题、西藏问题、驻南使馆被炸、撞机事件、法轮功等等,都会加深、加速敌意的积累,历史一再表明,如果两个国家的敌意是建立在不可调和的矛盾基础之上,那么这种敌意在经过一定时间和事件的积累后,必定趋向于极端而到达其质变终点,重大的战争冲突的发生是迟早的事情,战争酝酿期间会有缓和的因素出现,但仅仅起到拖延的作用,但酝酿的方向始终不变,除非出现某种因素能够消除敌意的根源。
现代历史一个典型的例子是第一次世界大战爆发前的奥匈帝国皇太子斐迪南被刺事件,最初谁也没想到他的被刺居然会引发大战爆发。据现有文献表明,当时欧洲主要国家的领导人从内心都极想避免战争,并为之而努力,但最后都无可奈何地、全力以赴地投入战争。极具戏剧性的现象是:东面的奥国皇太子被刺,大战却以西面的德国实施“史利芬计划”,18穿越中立国比利时向法国实行大迂回作战开始。所以,历史的教训是:敌意的积累、积累发生量变到质变--完成战争准备,才是大战爆发的真正原因,没有斐迪南被刺,以后其他事件也会引发大战。
这里需要引出一个重要问题,即敌意积累在量变到质变的旅途中,也存在着一个临界点,过了临界点,战争将不可避免,虽然不一定马上爆发。从以往战争史经验来看,临界点的标志是双方都完成了军事部署。一个被人忽略的现象是:战争双方都是在不知不觉的情况下越过临界点的。因为在敌意环境下,每个国家都按这种思维方式行事:另一方面尽量争取和平,一方面要做好军事上的准备,以免不测。这种想法和做法完全合情合理、完全正确。有一百个国家就会有一百个国家领导人这样做,过去、现在和将来的国家都会这样做,否则将误国误民。但这种合情合理、完全正确的选择掩盖了一个致命的导致开战的因素:做好战斗准备与对手打交道和没有做好战斗准备时打交道,态度和行为完全是不同的,甚至相反。没有做好战斗准备时可以妥协、忍让,做好战斗准备后就会变得不妥协、不忍让。双方都因完成战争部署、觉得未必会输甚至胜券在握而在某些事情的交涉上变得强硬起来,没有了回旋余地,最终导致军事摊牌。所以我们看到历史上许多国家都是不情愿地、无可奈何地走向战争。这些国家在进入战争前最后一刻仍然做着最后的和平努力,但为时已晚,一切和平努力都是徒劳的,因为在此之前,它们早已在不知不觉中越过了战争与和平的临界点。这是一个无法摆脱的怪圈,这个怪圈可表述为:“因为他们当初作出了正确的选择,所以他们必然走向战争。”目前,中国的作战部署是要打赢一场高科技的局部战争,美国的作战部署过去是在全球同时打赢两场局部战争,现在,国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德考虑战略重点由欧洲转向亚太,由打赢两场局部战争变为确保一场战争,双方的假想敌都很明确。目前双方显然还未准备完毕。如果笔者提出的“战争临界点”理论模式能够成立,则不妨对照一下,中美两国距战争与和平的“临界点”还有多远?中美两国是否意识到虽不愿战争却已不知不觉地迅速接近这一“临界点”?所以,中美之战虽然在时间上难以预测,但可判断,中美双方完成各自的军事部署、演练完各自的“史利芬计划”之日,很可能就是他们越过战争与和平的临界点之时。接下去就是时间、规模大小的问题了。

"敌意量变到质变"理论模型

当然,上述只是根据历史经验和历史上的规律对中美关系可能出现的前景所作的一种带有“历史宿命论”的描述。因为笔者发现,历史上的迦太基同罗马的对抗有点类似现在的中美对抗,前者地理上隔地中海相望,后者隔太平洋相望。前者相争始于西西里岛,后者冲突始于台湾岛。在罗马元老院里,“迦太基威胁论”占主导地位,一个叫加图的元老在元老院演说反复强调:“迦太基必须消灭”。19美国某些议员则经常在国会里散布“中国威胁论”。古代布匿战争的结果是:拥有绝对制海权的罗马人摧毁了丧失制海权的迦太基。不过,有一点值得注意,罗马起初并没有一定要消灭迦太基的意图。20尽管历史不会简单重复,但也别忘了历史有惊人的相似。
在21世纪,以往的历史规律在多大程度上起作用?中美关系第二种前景——和平相处的希望往往建立在这一疑问的基础上。但疑问毕竟是疑问,不能等于答案,答案目前是没有的,满意的答案要靠中美双方的努力,途径是存在。可以坚信,中美双方都不想发生局部或全面的军事冲突,所以现时双方打交道时,都小心翼翼,如临深渊,如履薄冰。
面对强手,中国如何应对?既然与美国打交道,就要准确理解它的基本战略意图和这种意图在实施中可能达到的程度。虽然美国对中国未来走向不明,对华政策朝三暮四,但有一点可以深信不疑:美国希望自己永远保持目前一强凌天下的地位,并且极力防止任何国家向他现有的地位挑战,这是美国对外政策的基本原则,这点任何一届美国政府都不会变化,变化的仅仅是贯彻这一原则的手段。因此,任何一个崛起的大国都将自动成为美国的对手,尽管这个崛起的大国并不想与美国作对。而意识形态与社会制度的差异和对立具有加剧这种紧张的功能。所以,美国对我们施加压力是情理中的事,从历史上看,新兴强国总是在老牌强国的压抑中崛起的,这几乎成为规律。
这种情形下,中国需确立一个应对的基本原则,并以此作为处理一切具体事务的核心原则。作为新兴强国所要考虑的是:如何在自己走向富强过程中尽可能压低成本,在同老牌强国不可避免的抗衡中尽可能少付代价,这是我们国家的根本利益所在。具体而言,中国的长远战略所要考虑的问题是,如何避免走近代以来,英、法、日、美、俄等国高成本的强盛之路,即避免以重大代价——通过大规模战争冲突、甚至像二战中的苏联冒灭顶之灾的风险取得强国地位的传统老路。这一原则应当成为中国当前和未来相当长的时期内,外交事务的核心原则。认清这点就不难发现,台湾问题并非中美关系中最重要的问题,处理台湾等一系列外交问题均以符合上述原则为准,21同时也要做好在国家次要利益方面妥协、退让的准备。
中美两国有许多误解,其中存在着一种互相恐惧的内容上的致命误解。一个比较普遍的现象是:当一个国家一旦遭受现实的外来威胁时,虽不清楚威胁的具体内容和后果是什么,但首先唤起的是这个国家历史记忆中最痛苦的经验,并用这种最痛苦的经验来填充未来恐惧的具体内容。目前中美两国都因关系紧张而唤起了各自的历史经验,中国的历史经验是被异族征服、割地赔款、领土分裂;美国是绥靖政策带来的德、意、日法西斯主义的猖狂。尤其是没有及早地遏制日本,让其坐大。“珍珠港事件”引爆的太平洋战争给美国留下极深的记忆。因此,很难说美国不是根据自己的痛苦经验来解读中国未来走向的,也很难说我们不是以自己的痛苦经验来判断美国未来的举动。
所以,即使美国把我们当作主要对手也并非问题之关键,关键的问题是:美国对我国的真正的威胁是什么?我国历史上传统的威胁是被异族入侵、征服或领土被割让。但是21世纪的世界文明毕竟超越了过去的传统做法,美国虽然想独霸世界,但毕竟有别于历史上的蒙古和满清、以及近代以来的日本,企图倾其国力入侵、征服、并吞我国领土。就这个意义上,美国对中国没有实质性的威胁。美国对台湾所持的态度,虽然客观上造成我们现时的分裂,但归根结底出自西方传统的商业利益,而非“东方式”的领土吞并欲望。当然,美国希望中国四分五裂,或成为李登辉所希望的被大卸七块。这样,中国永远不会对美国构成威胁。但前提是:美国不能付太大的代价,倾其国力冒险为之,美国决不会干,假如四分五裂的中国以另一种方式威胁美国在中国的市场、东亚乃至国际安全体制,美国也不乐意。所以美国希望中国稳定并非全是假话,其中反映了美国出于自身利益的另一种担忧,既反对台湾独立,又反对大陆动武的方针就是明证。在此种情形下,老子的“柔弱胜刚强”应是外交策略的核心(邓小平外交策略核心思想的传统来源即是老子哲学),中国同美国打交道尚有很大的回旋余地。“好风凭借力”,我们可借助美国守住“一个中国”的底线。以后要谨防的是:美国为扯我们的后腿而冒险突破这一底线。
我们要慎重考虑反对“霸权主义”的问题,因为,霸权是历史自然形成的,一个国家强盛到了没有对手的地步,必然以正义的名义在世界上为自己牟取利益,也必然推行自己的价值观。只要国家不退出历史舞台,任何国家到了这种地步,自然而然就获得了霸权。所以,霸权不是主观上想拿就能拿到,想推就能推掉,想反就能反得掉的。退一步说,即使反霸,也是全世界国家的事情,不是天定给某一个国家的任务。因此,与其以弱势对强势,引火烧身而没有一点益处,不如持不赞成也不反对的姿态为妥。检讨近年的外交得失,中国在科索沃问题上强出头与美国战略重点由欧洲向亚太转移不会没有关系。刻意“反霸”无异自己捡起一个大包袱背上,争取国际多元体制固然有利,但应该仔细考虑成本和代价问题。
对于现今和将来的“鹰派”上台,中国不到万不得已(如台湾独立),不要轻易对“鹰派”的强硬对华政策采取激烈的、无法对后果进行控制的反应,即不应被动地与美国“鹰派”发生“互动”。 当以“不变应万变”的态度对待之,如果中国被动地“跟进”,与“鹰派”发生“互动”,则会“无中生有”,美国“鹰派”预设的虚拟前提将被中国不明智的被动反应证明为“事实”。22具体地说,对于美国加强亚太军事部署,增加军费,可以采取不理会的策略,让其自感无趣,造成瞎忙活的效果,成为国内外反对派攻击的口舌。
由于未来强盛的中国走向不明,美国对华的“鹰派”和“鸽派”都不会消逝,他们将会随着特定的时间、事件交替影响着中美关系。因此,美国“鸽派”上台并不意味波澜不兴,美国“鹰派”上台也不意味着事情已经不可收拾。自由主义战略与现实主义战略在美国国内形成相互制约关系,中国在两者之间仍有一定的周旋空间和主动的余地。具体说,中国外交姿态或刚或柔在一定程度上影响美国采纳“鹰派”或“鸽派”的意见。
中美两国都已认识到两国的关系将影响他们后代子孙的幸福,人们应该相信中美两国主观愿望肯定都不愿发生战争,正如我们至今应该相信第一次世界大战前,英国和德国都不愿发生战争。美国人也应摆脱传统恐惧经验的阴影,了解和理解中国的历史传统和现实状况,切勿以自己的痛苦经验来曲解中国未来走向。在长远的、处于盲目性质的中美关系互动中,如何避免战争冲突,取决于中美两国现在和未来政治家们的智慧,而不是他们的愿望。今天双方既然都不能代替以后几代人的想法和做法,那么就把这一代人应该做得事情尽量做好。

(原载香港大学《 二十一世纪》2001年十月号)
说明:当我考虑能否用数学方式建立两个战争临界点理论模型时,我的学生李志光君很快帮我列出数学模型,在此表示感谢。

注释:
1 当国家的生死存亡同它所坚持的意识形态发生冲突时,意识形态往往退居次要地位。所以在拿破仑战争中,资产阶级的英国会同欧洲大陆的封建君主国们结成反法联盟,在第一次世界大战中,资本主义的英国、法国、美国会同封建君主制的俄国阶结成同盟,20世纪70年代,资本主义的美国同社会主义的中国结成同盟。当意识形态同国家生存利益一致时,与对手的冲突将会加倍地不可调和。俄国历史学者叶( 维(塔尔列写到:“马拉用来包缠自己头部的红头巾,对于欧洲统治者说来,比拿破仑的金色王冠还要可怕。1815年他们认为拿破仑正是要使‘马拉复活’来进行总的斗争。拿破仑不但不打算这样做,而且最怕这样做,但是,维也纳、伦敦、柏林和彼得堡都觉得他会这样做。而这更增加了他们对这位征服者的不可调和的敌意。”(叶(维(塔尔列《拿破仑传》商务印书馆1976年版,第364页)
2 奥斯曼土耳其与威尼斯除了东地中海的商业利益冲突外,还包括伊斯兰教与基督教意识形态的冲突,国家利益与意识形态一致终于导致1571年的勒颁多海战。
3 西、英除了在海上贸易发生利益冲突外,还存在不可调和的意识形态冲突,西班牙代表罗马的旧教,英国代表新教,国家利益和意识形态两个因素终于触发了1588年的阿马达海战,西班牙无敌舰队战败,英国从此逐渐成为海洋强国。
4 1789年法国大革命后,普鲁士(包括后来统一后的德国)同法国因领土争端和意识形态的对立而成为世仇,经历了普法战争、第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战。
5 欧盟国家也有核武器,综合国力强大,但因意识形态、国家制度、价值观念相同便产生了心理上的认同与亲和,美国虽然同欧盟有矛盾,但没有产生敌意。可见意识形态对敌意产生加剧的重要作用。拿破仑战争之所以空前激烈,就在于交战双方的国家生存利益同意识形态空前一致(英国是个特例,它在外交上所持的价值观是国家利益大于意识形态)。
6 1938年,英国首相张伯伦曾把“一揽子解决问题”的“慕尼黑协定”称作“我们一代人的和平”,但由于英德两国没有真正威胁到他们利益的共同敌人,希特勒德国没有一揽子解决问题的诚意,将英国人捉弄了一回。
7(俄)乌特金 “下个世纪的美国战略” 《国外社会科学文摘》2000年第2期
8 中国抗日战争爆发前,中日经济交流也达到了相当的规模,由于甲午战争以来,两国积怨太深,中国反日情绪经常导致抵制日货运动,对日本国内经济形成较大的冲击,从而加剧了政治、军事冲突的力度。中国的抗日战争验证了C沃尔茨等人的观点。
9 朱镕基总理最近在清华大学管理学院的讲话时说:“有人说,中国要靠美国,因为美国是中国第二大贸易伙伴。去年对 美国顺差五百亿,对欧洲顺差二三百亿,对东南亚逆差二百亿,对台湾逆差二百亿,对韩国逆差一百二十个亿美元(以上也是)。我认为,如果美国停止与中国贸易,他们的通货膨胀率马上就要上升两个百分点。他们需要我们的产品,因为我们有劳动力密集的优势,这是哪个国家也比不上的。一双名牌运动鞋,在中国成本12个美元,其中两个美元给了工资,他们拿到美国去马上120美元。如果没有中国,他们能以这样的价钱买到货物么?有人说,你现在在美国购买那么多的国债,如果他们一冻结,怎么办?我说,买美国国债利率最高,年初利率为6.5%,现在降到4%,但还是最高的,我每年可以拿回七八十亿美元的利息,有什么不好?美国敢冻结么,除非发生中美大战,世界大战。那时候我们在国外的外汇是三千个亿,但是外国在我国的投资是五千个亿。”而美国有关经济专家却认为:只要稍微增加些运费,美国给中国的货单在东南亚照样能发得掉。美国总统国家安全事务助理赖斯声称:“即使我们主张与中国经济往来,中国仍然是亚太地区稳定的一个潜在威胁,”主张“合作是要进行的,但当两国的利益发生冲突时,美国决不应害怕与中国对抗。”(见赖斯“促进美国国家利益”《战略与管理》2001年第3期)。可见双方都认为即使发生军事冲突,经济上也不见得会吃亏。
话虽这么说,但由此也应看到两国避免战争的可行途径,力争两国经济互补程度越过消除战争的临界点,以致两国发生再大的争执也不会考虑战争的可能性,使两国以政治和意识形态的对立、经济上的合作来维持和平局面。雷蒙?阿隆曾在20世纪50年代指出,阿拉伯国家同西欧国家的性质是政治对立,经济密不可分(见雷蒙•阿隆《论战争》第三章“外交领域的传统与变化”,美利坚大学英文版)。现在看来,阿拉伯世界与西方这种政治对立、经济互补的关系之所以能维持一个相当长的和平,原因是经济互补的程度越过了消除战争的临界点。阿拉伯世界同欧洲政治对立、经济互补这一和平模式也许给未来的中美关系提供了一个努力的方向。
10 笔者当时回答:一、中国将来不干什么,好好过日子;二、中国自己也不知道将来干什么,因为你们美国一百年前也不知道今天要干什么;三、中国将来干什么要根据美国将来干什么而定。
11 美国前国防部长威廉姆•佩里和助理国防部长艾什顿•卡特最近提出“预防性防御”的战略观点,这种正在实施的战略观点基于如下的考虑:“美国奉行‘正常状态’和孤立主义的政策,结果反倒被拖进一场全面战争,承担起打赢战争的重任。由于美国事先既未能阻止一个危险对手的崛起,事后又未能制止它的侵略,结果为了打败德国被迫二度参战。”(见《预防性防御——一项美国新安全战略》上海人民出版社,2000年1月版,第9页),美国正是从这些痛苦的经验中酝酿出遏制中国的念头。
12 国家不是物质生产的需要而诞生的,是战争的产物,是人类个人之间和群体之间双重敌对的需要的产物,因此,没有敌人的国家是不符合逻辑的,也是危险的,所以“居安思危”,在和平环境里,每一个健康国家的下意识里,都有寻找敌人的倾向。具体来说,没有假想敌人,国家庞大的军事机器就会因没有目标而费弛松懈,毫无战斗力。历史上的中国经常因为没有对手而变得没有战斗力,被弱小民族打败。
13 近年来美国实行是“遏制加接触”,但接触是为了更好地遏制,最终服从于遏制这一战略目标。
14 所以,中国在台湾问题上同美国打交道时应创造条件,力求使让美国认清:如果美国卷入台海冲突,它的损失远大于所得。
15 现任美国总统国家安全事务助理赖斯认为:“……。但总的来说贸易能打开中国的经济,最终也能打开中国的政治。这一观点要求我们相信市场与经济自由带动政治变革的力量,而这种力量已为世界各地的经验所证实。”(见赖斯“促进美国国家利益”《战略与管理》2001年第3期)
16 笔者前年曾撰文指出:“……但是事态不会按俄国人的意志发展,主动权握在美国人手里,美国必须在“守信”和“丧失良机”之间进行选择,假如美国既遵从俄国的意志,又遵守《反弹道导弹条约》,就意味着在能够摆脱“互为核人质”、不受任何拘束的时刻,丧失了机会,而这样的机会对美国来说,历史可能只提供一次,这种机会对任何一个国家都有着无法抗拒的诱惑力。任何条约同一个强国根本利益发生严重冲突之日,也就是条约约束力开始失效之时。可以断言,美国会不顾一切去争取历史赐于它的千载良机。”(剑与盔甲——评美国修改《反弹道导弹条约》《南方周末》1999.10.29)
17美国国务卿鲍威尔最近访华时表示:“President Bush believes, and I believe of course, that a constructive relationship between the United States and China is in the interest of the American and Chinese peoples, in the interest of our allies and friends in Asia, and in the world's interest.”(见Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov。抄件由美国驻上海总领事馆7月30日转发)。对华强硬态度比先前有所缓和,目前有个共识,美国每届新政府上台,对中国总是始争后和。我以为这一现象根本上源于美国的两种恐惧和对中国未来走向不明,而在表面呈现为国内各种政治、经济利益集团借中美关系此种性质牟取各自的利益。
18 从1899年开始,德国参谋总长阿•冯•史利芬就开始制定东西两面作战中,首先击溃法国的作战计划,直到1914年第一次世界大战爆发时的25年中,德国曾对此计划进行了反复修改和演练。
19 阿庇安著,《罗马史》上卷,商务印书馆,1995年版,第244页。
20 罗马与迦太基之间的敌意是否绝对不可化解?虽然是个历史之谜,但在逻辑的世界中仍是有答案的,第一次布匿战争后,罗马并非一定要消灭迦太基。由于迦太基内部政治动荡,迦太基元老院对掌握兵权的汉尼拔家族的政治迫害日益明显,汉尼拔权衡再三认定,只有把自己的国家带入战争,他的家族才能获得安全,于是他下决心破坏本国与罗马签订的和约,越过挨布尔河进攻罗马的盟邦萨干坦部落,导致第二次布匿战争的爆发。至此,罗马对迦太基的不守信用、反复无常留下深深的成见和恐惧,导致罗马在赢得第二次布匿战争的胜利后不久,下决心彻底毁灭迦太基。(见阿比安 《罗马史》上卷 ,商务印书馆,1995年版,第147页)
21 许多人认为:经济建设是中国当前的主要任务,外交事务应以此为原则。表面上看没什么大问题。但在理论上还是比较模糊。“经济建设为中心”事实上是“最小代价实现现代化强国”原则的手段之一,因为经济强盛带动综合国力、包括军事力量的强盛,一旦达到这一目标,国际事务中一些原先的麻烦会自动消失,没有达到综合国力的强盛,即使花很大代价也不一定解决问题,甚至出现灾难性后果,如台湾、南中国海等。笔者注意到1999年10月1日,中国举行的阅兵式上首次出现了空中加油飞机,此后,菲律宾政府在南沙群岛问题上的态度明显缓和多了。因为空中加油技术表明,中国空军具备了南沙上空持续作战的能力。
22 今后中国外交一个较大的问题是,如何在保持必要的尊严的前提下,争取到一个较长的和平环境。由于自鸦片战争以来,西方列强对中国的百年欺凌给中国民众心理带来严重的扭曲,加之以这段历史为主的几十年的爱国主义思想的灌输,使得中国在处理与外部冲突时,外交上难以把握“合理的、必要的让步”和“摇尾乞怜、屈膝求和”之间的差别。这种因羞愤而严重扭曲的心理经常会影响外交策略的正确选择。
以国民政府抗战前的外交为例,在收回租界、关税等问题上,不知英、美、日在中国的长远利益的差别,被对英美交涉的成功而冲昏头脑,以没有国家实力(主要是军事力量)为前提的强硬姿态对日交涉,由于国家实力同所持强硬态度和预期目标存在极大距离,刺激、诱发了日本国内强硬派的上台,不仅没有收回失地,反被占了东北,此时方知这是一场真正的实力较量,不是开会、游行、呼口号所能替代的,于是发现争取时间,增强国力才是当务之急,所以在“九一八事件”时采取“不抵抗政策。”但却难向因充满爱国激情而失去理智的民众作出交代,被视作“卖国行为”,陷于内外被动的困境。笔者以为;当时情况下外交思路、策略得当的话,纵然日本侵略中国之心不死,中日战争不可避免,但争取20年的准备时间还是有可能的,20年或更长时间后,在综合国力提高的情况下,中国抗战形势显然会有利的多。需要声明一点,笔者绝无为日本侵略中国的行径开脱之意,只是为了探讨当时在弱势对强势的情况下,弱势的中国是否在外交政策、策略上做到了最佳、最明智的选择?以便今天在同样是弱势对强势的中美格局中,提供一种经验和启示。历史的教训是:若把必要的妥协、暂时的让步在爱国主义情绪支配下等同于“屈膝投降”,将会招致国家利益更大的损失,并带来更大的屈辱。保持实力与强硬态度之间的合理平衡是外交艺术的核心问题,但国家内部政治派别斗争激烈的情况下,一项合理的外交政策很难达成共识和付诸实施,并经常被歪曲。

more